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Abstract
In a national ballot in 2009, Swiss citizens surprisingly approved an amend-
ment to the Swiss constitution to ban the further construction of minarets. The
ballot outcome manifested reservations and anti-immigrant attitudes in regions of
Switzerland which had previously been hidden. We exploit this fact as a natural
experiment to identify the causal effect of negative attitudes towards immigrants on
foreigners’ location choices and thus indirectly on their utility. Based on a regression
discontinuity design with unknown discontinuity points and administrative data on
the population of foreigners, we find that the probability of their moving to a mu-
nicipality which unexpectedly expressed stronger reservations decreases initially by
about 40 percent. The effect is accompanied by a drop of housing prices in these
municipalities and levels off over a period of about 5 months. Moreover, foreigners
in high-skill occupations react relatively more strongly highlighting a tension when
countries try to attract well-educated professionals from abroad.
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1 Introduction
The question of whether people care about how they are perceived by others is important
for understanding individual decision-making since many choices involve aspects of social
interaction. People’s attitudes towards one another are obviously central for bonding
decisions, but they are also crucial in determining the choices individuals make when
selecting an organization for employment or leisure. The issue might also arise when
people decide about which community they wish to live in. In this paper, we focus on this
relationship and ask to what extent the resident population’s attitudes are relevant for
such decisions. In particular, we analyze how foreigners react to unexpectedly revealed
reservations towards their group studying their location choices.
Attitudes towards foreigners influence the interaction between immigrants and the native
population in many ways. This matters for the successful realization of gains from trade
between these two parties as well as for the immigrants’ integration (see, e.g., Algan et al.,
2012; Akay et al., 2017). Specifically, a host country’s culture of welcome might affect
where mobile foreigners are willing to locate, and is crucial for regions that need to attract
experts from abroad. There is a large body of literature which discusses the sources and
expression of negative attitudes towards foreigners as reflected, for example, in right-
wing extremism (e.g., Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). However, foreigners’ behavioral
reactions to these attitudes and the consequences that they have for their welfare are
less often addressed.1 While economic models and analyses of foreigners’ location choices
offer an approach to learn about foreigners’ valuations of the overall attractiveness of an
environment, this field of research typically neglects the political attitudes of the resident
population. Moreover, the attempt to analyze the relationship between the presence of
foreigners and residents’ attitudes towards them poses a severe methodological challenge,
as it is necessary to overcome an inherent simultaneity (Dustmann and Preston, 2001).
On the one hand, the presence of foreigners may affect natives’ preferences and attitudes.
Getting to know foreigners may reduce prejudices, as postulated by the so-called contact
hypothesis, or the presence of foreigners may aggravate negative attitudes, as natives fear
pressure on the labor market and welfare system, and expect increases in the crime rate or
the alienation of their own culture. On the other hand, the attitudes of natives towards
foreigners may affect the presence of immigrants. Foreigners might move less to areas
where residents have reservations about them, where they fear discrimination or even
physical abuse.
In this paper, we analyze the role of attitudes towards foreigners in their choice of res-
idence based on a unique setting which allows us to address the identification problem
1A notable exemption is the study by Elsayed and De Grip (2018) who find that Islamist terrorist
attacks worsen attitudes towards Muslims in the Netherlands and go hand in hand with an increase in
Muslims’ intention to re-migrate. Moreover, Muslims’ attitudes towards integration are also negatively
affected by the terrorist attacks. Both effects are relatively larger for the highly educated immigrants.
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of simultaneity. As a moderator, we integrate identity utility, as introduced by Akerlof
and Kranton (2000). It allows us to capture the idea that perceived negative attitudes
towards foreigners affect their utility. In a national ballot 2009, Swiss citizens voted on
whether the further construction of minarets should be prohibited (the so-called minaret
initiative). Against the recommendation of the Swiss Federal Assembly and the predic-
tions of leading opinion pollsters, the amendment to the Swiss constitution was accepted
with a clear majority. The ballot outcome manifested reservations and anti-immigrant
attitudes in regions of Switzerland which had previously been hidden. There were mu-
nicipalities where voters unexpectedly deviated strongly from their past voting behavior
on migration-related issues. We exploit this fact and study whether the inflow of foreign-
ers to these particular municipalities declined in the aftermath of the vote, which would
be consistent with lower expected utility and provide evidence that individuals react to
perceived attitudes towards their social group.
The empirical analyses draw on administrative data for the universe of foreigners living
in Switzerland which allow us to study their moving behavior before and after the na-
tional vote on the minaret initiative. We proceed in two steps. First, in a preliminary
simple analysis, we estimate the change in the probability that some foreigner moves to
a municipality that unexpectedly approved the minaret initiative in the months after the
vote. The results suggest a reduction in this probability about three months after the vote
has taken place. Second, in the main analysis, a more appropriate econometric approach
is pursued flexibly taking canton-specific situations into account. Based on a simulation
study, we expect that any effect materializes as a sharp decline in the likelihood that a for-
eigner chooses to move to a municipality that had unexpectedly revealed its reservations
towards foreigners some time after the vote. Since the point in time at which the effect
can be observed is not deterministically predictable, the change in residential relocation
patterns is analyzed based on a regression discontinuity design (RDD) with unknown dis-
continuity points (Porter and Yu, 2015). We find such discontinuous jumps in the moving
pattern of foreigners in 12 cantons. We observe that foreigners are deterred from locating
in municipalities that unexpectedly revealed negative attitudes towards them (‘switcher
municipalities’, for a definition see Section 2.2). The estimated effect is sizable. In cantons
where reactions could be identified, the probability that a foreigner chooses one of these
municipalities drops, on average, by approximately 4.9 percentage points within the first
month relative to a pre-intervention level of 13 percent, and thus by about 40 percent.
Our interpretation that switcher municipalities became less attractive due to the change
in perceived political attitudes is consistent with reactions in the moving behavior to other
types of municipalities. We observe that foreigners are more likely to move to municipal-
ities that became relatively more open and are equally likely to move to municipalities
whose relative position has not changed.
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Several validation checks suggest that the assumptions underlying the RDD hold: Nei-
ther the number of foreigners moving nor the municipalities that unexpectedly reveal their
reservations about immigrants are systematically different before and after the threshold
dates. The effect holds to a similar extent for groups of foreigners other than Muslims.
This suggests that foreigners identify with the affected minorities and that they perceived
the support for the initiative as being an expression of negative attitudes towards im-
migrants in general. Moreover, we document that the overall effect is similar in size for
individuals moving within a narrow radius, which is most probably not attributable to
a job change. Still, the effect differs across specific groups of foreigners and over time.
While it is substantial for first-generation foreigners, there is no discernible effect for
second-generation foreigners. The latter are often well assimilated and seem to be less
affected by the revealed attitudes. This finding emerges from exploring a potential alter-
native explanation, i.e. that landlords will dare to discriminate more against foreigners
once they learn about the reservations of their fellow citizens. This supply-driven reac-
tion, however, would to some extent affect foreigners in general. We further find that
foreigners in high-skill occupations react more strongly than foreigners in low-skill occu-
pations. While this finding is interesting in itself, it further suggests a primarily demand
driven mechanism. Finally, the effect fades after about 5 months. This might be due
to the declining salience of the issue as time elapses and/or due to adjustments in the
housing market. In the latter case, lower rents compensate foreigners for the disutility of
living in an environment with negative attitudes towards them. The results of a supple-
mentary analysis indeed suggests a reduction in housing prices for switcher municipalities
in the aftermath of the vote. Our data does not allow investigating potential reactions
by the native population. Otherwise we could explore whether the identified reaction
on the housing market is due to changes in citizens’ location choices in response to the
newly revealed attitudes. It is well conceivable that some Swiss also shun municipalities
where they consider their fellow citizens to hold political preferences they could not align
with. This suggests that voting outcomes could be considered an important source of
information contributing to preference-based spatial sorting more broadly.
Our analysis contributes inter alia to the growing literature on the interdependent rela-
tionship between the presence of immigrants and attitudes towards them. Studies that
investigate the effect that an inflow of foreigners has on the native population’s attitudes
hereby face a methodological challenge. There is the possibility of common unobserved
drivers as well as potential reverse causality, which arises due to a possible effect from at-
titudes on foreigners location choices. In pioneering work, Dustmann and Preston (2001)
analyze the effect of the local ethnic composition on natives’ attitudes towards foreigners
in the United Kingdom. They propose an IV approach by using the ethnic composition
of large-scale areas as an instrument for the composition in local areas. In their study,
simultaneity bias matters and correcting for it reveals that a higher share in the (ethnic)
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minority population is associated with more hostile attitudes in the majority population.
Several studies build on this idea to take potential endogeneity into account in other con-
texts (see, e.g., Dill, 2013; Kuhn and Brunner, 2018; Barone et al., 2016; Méndez Martínez
and Cutillas, 2014; Halla et al., 2017; Gerdes and Wadensjö, 2008). While the potential
relationship between attitudes and location choices is acknowledged, there is little direct
evidence on whether foreign individuals’ location choices indeed relate to perceived atti-
tudes per se or whether the potential relationship is rather driven by resulting tangible
(living) conditions.
To the best of our knowledge, there are five studies that are concerned with the question
of whether minority groups’ location choices react to attitudes or behavior towards them.
An early analysis by Tolnay and Beck (1992) documents the relationship between racial
violence in U.S. counties and the outmigration of the threatened group between 1910 and
1930. In related work, Henry (2009) finds that African Americans are less likely to move
to places where they face a higher risk of becoming the victim of a hate crime. These
interesting findings are primarily descriptive in nature and likely linked to tangible living
conditions, i.e., the fear of physical violence. Waisman and Larsen (2016) investigate the
quasi-random variation in the initial placement of asylum seekers in Sweden in conjunction
with measures of attitudes based on survey data, which they use to approximate migrants’
living conditions and potential discrimination. They find some evidence that refugees’
subsequent location choices are related to natives’ surveyed attitudes. Damm (2009)
investigates regional factors that influence immigrants’ location choices in Denmark. She
also uses a quasi-random placement of asylum seekers and finds that the hazard to leave
the municipality which he or she is assigned to increases with the share of votes for right-
wing parties. The behavioral reaction is interpreted as welfare seeking behavior. The
most recent study is by Gorinas and Pytliková (2017), who investigate whether surveyed
attitudes towards immigrants have an impact on migration flows at an international level.
They perform a cross-national study and find that the surveyed dismissive attitudes of
natives are negatively correlated with migrant inflows.
While these five studies indicate that adverse conditions are related to minorities’ location
choices, perceived attitudes cannot be separated from, and likely capture, related tangible
(living) conditions, they might possibly work indirectly, and/or their potential endogeneity
is not accounted for. We pursue a novel strategy and measure attitudes towards immi-
grants directly based on voting behavior in ballots widely observed by the public. We
thereby exploit a surprising revelation of negative attitudes to identify the causal effect of
attitudes on location choices. This approach allows us to compare location choices within
the same choice set of municipalities and the same population before and after the new
information is available and thus enables us to capture the effect of perceived attitudes
independently of tangible living conditions. Furthermore, our analysis is not confined to
a specific group of foreigners, such as refugees, but applies to the large group of labor
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migrants. Finally, our empirical study presents the first comprehensive application of a
regression discontinuity design with unknown thresholds as recently proposed by Porter
and Yu (2015).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background
information on the institutional setting as well as on the informational conditions defining
the municipalities that unexpectedly reveal a shift towards an anti-immigration position.
Section 3 describes our reasoning on how perceived attitudes influence an individual’s
utility and how this affects his or her location choice. Based on these considerations,
Section 4 outlines the empirical strategy. Our data sources are described in Section 5.
The results are presented in Section 6, and validated and discussed in Section 7. Section 8
offers complementary evidence on the development of housing prices. Section 9 concludes.
2 Background and Informational Setting
Our study draws on information about voting behavior in national referendums that is
used to infer residents’ revealed attitudes towards foreigners and the changes in these
publicly visible attitudes over time. In order to understand this specific informational
setting, we first provide some background information about one specific proposition, the
minaret initiative, and briefly introduce direct democratic decision-making in Switzer-
land. In a second step, we specify the circumstances which characterize voting behavior
in the minaret initiative and explain why the vote outcome unexpectedly reveals reserva-
tions towards foreigners. Finally, we discuss how the ballot outcome entered foreigners’
information base.
2.1 The vote on the minaret initiative
On November 29, 2009, a majority of Swiss voters unexpectedly approved an initiative
that banned the further construction of minarets in Switzerland.2
2The Swiss direct democratic system, among other things, allows the electorate to propose amendments
to the federal constitution by launching a so-called popular initiative. Initiators have to collect 100,000
valid signatures amounting to about two percent of the population of Swiss citizens. Once this hurdle is
overcome, voters decide in a national referendum on whether the constitution should be changed. This
is the case if the initiative is approved by the majority of voters overall as well as in a majority of
cantons. If this holds, the federal government is obliged to implement the will of the majority. For an
overview about the Swiss political system, see, for example, Linder (2010). Swiss citizens are accustomed
to expressing their opinions at the poll (Stutzer et al., 2018). Direct democratic decision-making is very
common in Switzerland, even at the national level. Citizens openly discuss the proposals and can rely
on being provided with ample coverage of the issues in the media. Newspapers, for example, publish the
statements and voting recommendations of political parties and opinion leaders. Frey (1994) analyses
the role of public discussion in the process of direct democratic decision-making, with an emphasis on
the Swiss experience.
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In the aftermath of 9/11 with its increased fear of terrorism, a discussion arose about
whether practicing Muslims in Switzerland would threaten the democratic order. In this
anxious atmosphere, two Swiss center-right conservative parties, i.e. the Swiss People’s
Party and the Federal Democratic Union, started preparations for the minaret initiative
against the further construction of minarets. At this point in time, there were only four
minarets in the whole of Switzerland. For their construction a permit was necessary,
requiring that the construction plans comply with the cantonal and communal rules. Due
to these existing restrictions, it was not to be expected that many minarets would be
built in Switzerland. It was also clear that the proposed amendment would not change
anything in the religious practice of Swiss Muslims. Mosques were already present, and
their right to exist was not affected by the initiative.
During the campaign and beyond, the initiative was widely discussed in the Swiss media
and attracted global attention. The degree of public attention that this issue attracted
can partly be ascribed to the campaign advertisement. One of the initiative’s campaign
posters showed a woman in a black niqab and the Swiss flag with looming minarets repre-
senting rockets (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A). The Federal Commission against Racism
judged that this visual tactic would jeopardize public peace and therefore banned it from
being displayed in some towns and cantons.3 Overall, the campaign raised fundamental
discussions about religious freedom, cultural diversity and tolerance in Switzerland and
was very salient in the media. The discussion was not limited to Muslims in Switzerland,
but also involved the issue of migration and the treatment of minorities in general (see,
e.g., Ettinger and Imhof, 2014).
Most parties and the Swiss Federal Assembly recommended that the initiative be rejected.
However, contrary to general expectations as well as the forecasts of leading opinion
researchers that the initiative would not be passed, it was accepted with a clear majority
of 57.5 percent of the votes. Many citizens were mobilized (53.3 percent) and expressed
more than a signal against the spread of the Islam in Switzerland but a general discomfort
in the face of societal change and immigration experienced as a threat to Swiss cultural
identity (see, e.g., Freitag and Rapp 2013 or Wehrli 2009). From the perspective of many
foreigners, the vote outcome was perceived as a disturbing sign that provoked a general
sense of exclusion (see, e.g., the individual reactions reported in Thiriet 2009). The
decision came into effect at the national level and no minarets have been built since. In
the exercise of their religion, however, nothing has changed for Muslims in Switzerland.
In the aftermath of the unexpected approval, there was substantial post-election news cov-
erage. On all the Swiss media channels, the unreckoned outcome was discussed and the
municipal voting patterns made prominent news. Most Swiss newspapers presented maps
indicating which municipalities of a canton supported or rejected the initiative. Some-
3The campaign poster was, for example, forbidden in Basel, Freiburg, Lausanne, Morges, Neuenburg,
Nyon, and Yverdon.
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times, even the vote district results were discussed and displayed.4 For Swiss citizens and
foreigners alike, it was easy to learn about attitudes across municipalities and to spread
the word about the municipalities that were expressing more pronounced reservations
towards foreigners.
2.2 Attitudes towards foreigners across municipalities
The acceptance of the initiative did not only come as a surprise, but the voting pat-
tern across municipalities did not match the rather stable political spectrum of views
on migration manifested in prior votes. There were municipalities that unexpectedly re-
vealed anti-immigrant attitudes, which external observers had not previously perceived.
We thus see the event as an exogenous shock in perceived attitudes towards foreigners in
some municipalities.
The vote on the minaret initiative provides a particularly attractive setting to capture
information about citizens’ attitudes. It can be conceptualized as a low-cost decision in-
volving virtually no instrumental considerations about economic consequences, but rather
allowing fully expressive voting behavior. Previous votes, such as the initiative "for the
regulation of immigration" held on September 24, 2000, provoked serious concerns about
negative economic repercussions in the case of their approval. The voting behavior on
the minaret initiative thus revealed rather unambiguous signals about attitudes towards
foreigners and allows us to measure potential changes in the publicly visible positioning
of municipalities, i.e., changes relative to the best approximation as derived from pre-
vious voting behavior. Importantly, access to representative information about regional
attitudes is just as accessible to us as researchers as it is to the people observed in our
study. We consider the changes in perceived attitudes as exogenous shock to individuals’
information base. The outcome is not anticipated and reveals new information. Informa-
tion, which foreigners can incorporate in their perception about the political orientation
of people across municipalities.
In order to use the exogenous shock to measure the effect of perceived attitudes on for-
eigners’ location choices, we identify the municipalities that revealed previously unknown
preferences based on a comparison with relevant votes in the past. In particular, we rely
on four votes that occurred within a time frame close to the minaret initiative and which
are sufficiently contextually related to it, i.e., in that they also involve the expression of
attitudes towards foreigners. We code the voting results such that a higher vote share
reflects more restrictive attitudes towards migration and foreigners.5
4Figures A.2 and A.3 in Appendix A provide examples of maps displaying the outcome where approval
is marked green and rejection is marked red.
5These votes include (i) the initiative "For the regulation of immigration" ("Initiative für eine Regelung
der Zuwanderung") held on September 24, 2000, (ii) the initiative "Against the abuse of the asylum law"
("Initiative gegen Asylrechtsmissbrauch") held on November 24, 2002, (iii) the referendum on "The federal
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Figure 1 Voting outcomes in switcher and non-switcher municipalities
Specifically, a municipality is characterized as having unexpectedly revealed negative at-
titudes towards foreigners if the following criteria are fulfilled:
• The average support for restrictive migration policies in the past is below the mean
for the canton they belong to.
• The swing to a more restrictive position, as expressed in the vote on the minaret
initiative, is larger than the mean change across all the municipalities within the
canton.
• The support for the minaret initiative exceeds 50 percent of the municipality’s active
electorate.
We label these municipalities with the generic term "switcher municipalities".
The first criterion is motivated by the idea that the respective municipalities were per-
ceived as being relatively tolerant up to the vote on the minaret initiative. The second
criterion ensures that only municipalities which experienced a large shift are considered
to be switchers, given that nearly all the municipalities shifted to the right. The third
criterion guarantees that the municipality voted in favor of the minaret initiative thus
providing a signal that the majority agrees with the proposition. The latter point is
important for the media coverage (see below). Based on these three criteria, we classify
approximately 24 percent of all municipalities in Switzerland as switchers. The graphs in
Figure 1 show how the voting results are distributed when comparing switcher and non-
switcher municipalities. First, citizens in switcher municipalities voted less restrictive on
migration issues in former votes (used to calculate the ex ante perceived level of critical
decree regarding the regular naturalization and the easier naturalization of young, and second-generation
foreigners" ("Referendum zum Bundesbeschluss über die ordentliche Einbürgerung sowie über die erle-
ichterte Einbürgerung junger Ausländerinnen und Ausländer der zweiten Generation") held on September
26, 2004, and (iv) the referendum on "The federal decree about the acquisition of citizenship rights by
third-generation foreigners" ("Referendum zum Bundesbeschluss über die ordentliche Einbürgerung sowie
über erleichterte Einbürgerung junger Ausländerinnen und Ausländer der dritten Generation") also held
on September 26, 2004.
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Figure 2 Rank change of switcher and non-switcher municipalities. A positive rank change
indicates that the involved municipalities voted more restrictively on migration in the minaret
initiative than in previous votes (compared to the other municipalities in a cantonal ranking).
The rank change is measured as a percentage of the number of municipalities within the canton.
attitudes towards foreigners). Second, however, in the minaret initiative municipalities
from the two groups cast similarly restrictive votes, on average. Third, when focusing on
the change in the support of a restrictive position towards migration, a larger difference
is observed for switcher municipalities than for non-switcher municipalities. Descriptive
statistics on the criteria are reported in Table E.2 in Appendix E.1.
As a generally large fraction of the voting population approved a restrictive position in
the minaret initiative, it could well be that the relative positioning of the municipalities in
terms of expressed reservations has not changed at all. Accordingly, we rank municipalities
within their cantons, once with regard to their average yes vote share in the four migration-
related propositions that took place before the minaret initiative, and once on the basis
of the vote outcomes in the minaret initiative. Figure 2 shows the average relative rank
changes for switcher and non-switcher municipalities in all Swiss cantons. A positive
change indicates that the municipality increased its rank by expressing a relatively more
restrictive position towards immigration. Overall, a clear picture emerges that switcher
municipalities gained in rank and non-switcher municipalities lost in rank. The relative
strength of expressed reservations towards foreigners has thus changed between switcher
and non-switcher municipalities. Two exceptions being, firstly the canton of Geneva,
where there are no switching municipalities as no municipality accepted the initiative and
the canton of Zug where the average rank changes are zero and no switcher municipality
changed its relative position.
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3 Theory
In this section, we derive our main hypothesis of how newly revealed perceived attitudes
could affect individuals’ location choices and under which conditions such reactions can
be ascribed to perceived attitudes per se. We continue by our reasoning of how such
reactions could materialize and be identified in observational data of individuals moving
behavior.
3.1 Location choice including identity utility
We assume that the economy is in equilibrium and that individuals take municipality
characteristics as given when choosing their location. We explicitly focus on the location
choice and take the decision to move as given. Thus, we think about the choices of indi-
viduals once they have decided that they will move and face a continuum of municipalities
and their characteristics in their choice set. We argue that their decision to move is much
less affected by the new information about attitudes towards foreigners than their decision
about where to move. First, the decision to move is much more costly than a change in the
decision about where to move. Second, individuals residing in municipalities which were
disclosed to hold negative attitudes towards foreigners might have already been aware of
their neighbors’ attitudes and would know that living conditions have not changed. As
we argue that the surprising vote outcome is primarily a revelation of attitudes, rather
than a change in attitudes.6
The utility Uijt of an individual i (i = 1, ..., n) living in municipality j (j = 1, .., J) at
time t depends on several municipality characteristics Cjt and individual characteristics
Idit. Municipality characteristics that influence individual utility are, e.g., taxes, housing
prices, the provision of public goods, but also natural beauty or social ties. Individ-
ual characteristics involve an individual’s income, the preference for housing, and other
individual characteristics such as family status.
If people have a sense of self and care about how they perceive themselves as human
beings and how they are perceived by others, this sense (or identity utility) should be an
additional factor entering the expected utility of living in a particular municipality (see,
e.g., the model on identity by Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). This proposition would be
in line with research in social psychology. There, it is well documented, that perceiving
even slightly repellent behavior of others can produce psychological and physical distress.
Investigations on ostracism show that individuals strongly react to perceived exclusion,
as it threatens the fundamental needs of belonging and increases negative affect.7 In
6We test this supposition in a supplementary empirical analysis (see Section 7.3) and do not find
systematic reactions in the decisions to move.
7For example, regions of the brain that are important for pain detection are activated. Moreover,
individuals are highly sensitive in detecting situations of exclusion (see, e.g., Williams, 2009; Williams
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a recent survey study, Rudert et al. (2017), for example, investigate whether foreigners
feel ostracized after a popular vote on migration in Switzerland in 2014. They find that
foreigners’ perceptions of their environment reflect the vote outcome and that immigrants’
need for belonging is less satisfied where citizens voted more restrictively. This holds even
though the investigated group would not have been materially affected by the resulting
legislation.
The behavior or perceived attitudes of others which, in our case, refer to the revealed
attitudes of natives can differ across municipalities j and in time t. We assume that
individuals update their information about the set of choices at the level of municipalities
when they move. This includes their perceptions of attitudes towards their social class
based on the past voting record of the municipalities.
3.2 Changes in perceived attitudes and moving decisions
Revealed attitudes towards foreigners in a municipality may change over time and thus
also individuals’ optimal location choices. Individuals choose their location such that their
utility is maximized within their choice set. Thus, individual i will choose to locate in
municipality j if, and only if,
Uijt > Uikt for all k 6= j,
the utility to live there is higher than in all other municipalities in the choice set (see,
e.g., McFadden, 1974).
The location choice of individuals is in equilibrium before t and new information about
attitudes across municipalities is revealed between t and t + 1, leading individuals to
update their utility expectations. In our specific setting, the newly revealed information
is the voting outcome on the minaret initiative in Switzerland. This new information
can be seen as an exogenous change in perceived attitudes, as it was unexpected and
does not have direct implications for the other municipality characteristics. Assuming
that the utility is decreasing in reservations or negative attitudes, this revelation should
lead to a lower probability to choose a municipality revealing more negative attitudes
than has been expected. However, it has to be considered that this is only true if the
relative positioning of municipalities with respect to this characteristic also changes. If
all municipalities in an individuals’ choice set were to express stronger reservations and
the relative positioning stayed the same, we would not expect any change in observed
behavior. Our definition of switcher municipalities above does take this reasoning into
account. We would thus expect that individuals shun to move to municipalities which
expressed stronger reservations than expected, and changed their positioning relative to
the other municipalities in the choice set, after the vote has taken place.
and Nida, 2011). Related evidence based on panel data in Germany shows that higher vote shares of
right-wing parties are associated with lower reported life satisfaction for immigrants (Knabe et al., 2013).
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Whether somebody is affected by a change in attitudes towards foreigners depends on the
extent to which he or she identifies with this social group or cares about political attitudes
in this dimension. Residents with a foreign passport might identify strongest with the
social group of foreigners due to their ancestry, ethnicity or prior experiences. As an
individual to some extent chooses his or her identity, it is also possible that an individual’s
self-ascribed social category reacts to the new information. This idea is grounded in the
rejection-identification model in social psychology (Tajfel, 1978; Branscombe et al., 1999).
This theory asserts that when a minority group member perceives prejudice against his
or her group, that member will develop a stronger identification with the group in order
to reduce the psychological cost of perceived prejudice. Moreover, group identities may
develop as a result of perceived prejudice, i.e., minority groups tend to identify with other
minority groups under threat (Schmitt et al., 2003; Wesselmann et al., 2009).
Building on these considerations from economics and social psychology, we hypothesize
that a negative change in perceived attitudes leads to a lower expected utility of residing
in these municipalities, and thus to a lower probability that foreign individuals move
to municipalities surprisingly revealing negative attitudes. In our context, the minaret
initiative, we would expect not only Muslims but also other groups of foreign residents
to experience ostracism, as their identity as foreigners in Switzerland becomes salient.
Specifically, we would also expect EU citizens to be negatively affected by the initiative,
if the identity as a foreigner is the moderating factor. This hypothesis would in principle
also hold for Swiss citizens who care about political attitudes of fellow residents in this
dimension.
If an individual who would have chosen j in t, chooses a different municipality k in t+ 1,
in t the expected utility to live in j is higher than in k, and the reverse in t + 1. This
might be the case either because the utility to live in j has fallen from t to t + 1, or the
utility to live in k has risen; or both.
There are two crucial conditions that need to hold in order to ascribe a potential change
in the location choice to the change in perceived local attitudes towards the social group.
I. Municipality characteristics have not changed systematically between t and t + 1
(Cjt = Cjt+1 = Cj).
II. Moving individuals are, on average, the same in t and t+1. Thus, individual-specific
characteristics have not changed systematically between t and t+1 (Idit = Idit+1 =
Idi).
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Given these conditions hold, the component in the utility function that could have changed
the relative attractiveness of municipality j are perceived attitudes towards individuals’
social categories, potentially through identity utility.8
3.3 Identification of reactions to perceived attitudes based on lo-
cation decisions
Given the conditions mentioned before hold, it should be possible to identify the effect
of the signal on the location choice by comparing the location decisions of foreigners
who choose their residency before and after the vote has taken place. Thus, before the
information was revealed. Individuals decide to move at some point in time. Whether they
find a new home on a specific day, say the day before or after the vote has taken place, can
be considered as random with respect to a specific voting date. While an individual who
finds a new apartment the day before the vote cannot incorporate the information on the
outcome that will be revealed the next day in his or her choice, an individual who finds
an apartment the day after can utilize the information on the outcome. Accordingly,
individuals who decide to move and choose an apartment narrowly before the voting
day can be used as a control group for those who make this decision shortly after the
vote has taken place (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960). If revealed preferences of the
voting population about their attitudes towards foreigners play no role for the relative
attractiveness of municipalities, foreigners’ location decisions should, on average, be the
same before and after the vote. However, if the mover is affected by perceived attitudes
towards his or her group, we should observe a clear change in a mover’s location decision.9
In order to apply this theoretical identification strategy, we would like to compare the
location choices of people who decided where to move before the new information became
public with those who decided afterwards. In particular, we would like to exploit the
presence of switcher municipalities (described in Section 2), for which we argue that new
information was unexpectedly revealed and which changed their relative positioning with
respect to the openness towards foreigners. We thus aim to compare the probability that
a foreigner chooses to move to one of the identified switcher municipalities before receiving
the new information and after receiving it. If there was no lag between the time of the
decision to move and the observed moving date, any effect should materialize right away,
8Please note that the two conditions are close to the identifying assumptions in a RDD context.
Condition I is close to the the conditional independence assumption, and condition II is close to the local
randomization assumption.
9Our identification strategy deviates from related strategies based on close election outcomes (see,
e.g., Folke, 2014). In particular, we are not studying the consequences of the vote outcome on the people
who voted as it is in some form usually the case in studies using election results. Instead, we study
the consequences of the newly revealed information for a group of people, i.e. the foreigners outside of
the municipality, who are not themselves involved in generating the vote outcome. These foreigners face
the same (or a more) limited set of information as we the statisticians. Given the publicly available
information, the deviations from the past voting records were news.
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and the test could be approached using a regression discontinuity design, i.e., exploiting
the local randomization in the time of the moving decision around the vote date. However,
in observational data where only the moving and not the decision date is observed and
where there is a lag, it is not evident which date separates the two groups. Shortly after
the vote on the minaret initiative, many observed movers must have made their location
choice before the vote took place and who were therefore unable to incorporate the new
information. The longer the time is that elapses after the polling day, the larger will be the
number of movers who have made their location choice based on the updated information
set. The two groups might therefore overlap for some time until only movers who could
incorporate the new information are observed. The corresponding time lag relative to the
polling day might vary by region, as it might be affected by the length of notice periods
and the situation in the housing market. In the next subsection, we provide a framework
to analyze how the new information is incorporated into individuals’ observed location
choices. In Section 4, we translate the insights into our main empirical strategy.
3.4 Incorporation of new information in observed location choices
The location choice equilibrium for foreigners materializes in a stable aggregate probability
of choosing a particular municipality type. This holds over time and refers in our context
to the switcher and non-switcher municipalities. For the individual location decision, we
as statisticians, however, typically only observe the moving date, but not the decision
date. Accordingly, "observed" individual location choices might be based on different
information sets. There is a timespan after the vote, during which we observe a mixture
of those people who made their location choice before the information became public
and those who decided subsequently. Any effect of the change in perceived attitudes
materializes to the extent that the search generation that could incorporate the new
information outweighs the prior search generations. This transition between the search
cohorts could be smooth or sharp.
To gain an idea of how the effect could materialize, we perform a simulation analysis of
individual location choices.10 We simulate a simple location search with overlapping search
generations. Two institutional scenarios are considered, and a negative treatment effect
on the probability of moving to a switcher municipality is assumed. First, only search
frictions exist, and people move once they have found an apartment. Second, a notice
period is taken into account. It is revealed that in the second setting, the new information
is incorporated later on in the aggregate outcome, i.e. in the inflow of individuals to the
switcher municipalities, than in the first setting. Moreover, the adjustment pattern also
reveals a much steeper drop in the probability of moving to a switcher municipality in
10 Appendix B presents the details of the analysis.
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the scenario with a notice period than in the scenario without one. With search frictions
alone, in most cases, a rather gradual adjustment to the new equilibrium occurs.
Based on the assumption that it is random when an individual chooses to move and finds
an apartment and that we know at which date the one group outweighs the other, a
regression discontinuity framework seems suitable to analyze the incorporation of the new
information. However, the threshold value to separate treated from control individuals
is not as evident in the situation where the housing market and institutions affect the
lag between the decision to move and the observed move. We apply the method of a
regression discontinuity design with unknown discontinuity points (as introduced in the
following Section 4) to identify the threshold and to measure the drop. The simulation
clearly indicates that in an environment with legal restrictions that delay moving - such as
a notice period - the method can separate the groups and find the simulated discontinuity.
The discontinuity materializes at the point in time when the search cohort that could
incorporate the new information starts to outweigh the cohort that could not incorporate
the new information. This is not always the case in the scenario with search frictions
alone. Given the rental agreements in Switzerland that stipulate mandatory as well as
discretionary notice periods, the effect of a change in attitudes towards foreigners should
be identifiable in observed moving dates.
4 Empirical strategy: RDD with unknown discontinu-
ity points
Based on the theoretical considerations, we derived predictions on how individual location
choices in response to new information translate into changes in aggregate migration flows
between municipalities. In an environment with institutional restrictions, any displace-
ment effect, is expected to materialize as a jump (or discontinuity) in the probability that
a foreigner will choose to locate in a switcher municipality some time after the vote has
taken place. In principle this estimation problem shares many features of a classical regres-
sion discontinuity design (RDD). However, in most RDD applications the discontinuity
point is known, since it is, for instance, determined by the institution being analyzed. In
our application though, this is not the case. The discontinuity point is the result of the
interaction between the state of the housing market and institutional conditions such as
the notice period. As a consequence, it is not deterministically predictable a priori when
the discontinuity is expected to occur.
Porter and Yu (2015) have recently proposed an approach that is particularly well suited
for the problem at hand. They develop a nonparametric procedure to perform regression
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discontinuity analyses when discontinuity points are unknown, but predicted by theory.11
The procedure starts with a specification test. It tests the null hypothesis of no treatment
effect, or that of no discontinuity in the relationship between a dependent variable y and a
running variable x. Subsequently, the discontinuity point or threshold is estimated, given
that the specification test rejects the null hypothesis. Finally, a standard RDD analysis is
performed. As the authors find that the estimation of the threshold value does not affect
the efficiency of the estimator of the discontinuity, the threshold value can be treated
as known when estimating the RDD. The proposed approach, in principle, allows us to
separate the treated and the untreated individuals in settings where a RDD would be
appropriate; however the threshold is unknown.
In classical RDD studies, the forcing variable, also referred to as the running variable, is
used to determine the treatment status. When the value of this variable exceeds a certain
threshold, observations are treated, but not so below this value. If individuals have no
perfect control over the value of the forcing variable, the random variation narrowly around
the threshold can be exploited to estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) at
this particular point (see, e.g., Hahn et al., 2001, Imbens and Lemieux, 2008, and Lee
and Lemieux, 2010 for reviews of the RDD). The crucial assumptions for the validity of
a sharp RDD are the local randomization and the continuity of conditional expectations,
which provides that, without the treatment, both groups are alike at the threshold. The
latter assumption makes sure that in a world without the treatment or in a world where
everyone is treated, there would be no discontinuity in the conditional expectations at the
threshold, i.e., that any effect can be attributed to the treatment.
In order to determine the point at which we can potentially separate the treatment and
control group in our setting, we follow the approach proposed by Porter and Yu (2015)
and apply the RDD with unknown discontinuity points. While this section concentrates
on conveying the basic idea behind the procedure in a sharp RDD, we refer the interested
reader to Section C in the Appendix for more details about the implementation of the test
statistics and the proceeding. As we are, to our knowledge, the first to comprehensively
apply the approach, we lay out how applied econometricians can implement the proposed
procedure.12
The starting point of the procedure is to test whether there is a discontinuity in the
relationship between the outcome variable and the forcing variable. In our application
this is testing for a discontinuity in the relationship of the probability to move to a switcher
11Card et al. (2008) are - to our knowledge - the first who try to estimate an unknown threshold
value in order to estimate effects at this point. In their application, they are interested in the presence
of a minority population in a municipality and the share after which the majority starts to leave the
municipality; i.e., a tipping point based on the Schelling model about dynamics in segregation (Schelling,
1971).
12A discussion of the fuzzy case and an in-depth discussion of the theoretical derivations and the method
are presented in the original paper (Porter and Yu, 2015).
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municipality and the moving date. We test
H
(2)
0 : no effects & selection only
H
(2)
1 : treatment effect only & both selection and treatment effect. (1)
IfH(2)0 cannot be rejected, we abstain from further analysis as we are interested exclusively
in cases where there is a treatment effect. According to the approach by Porter and
Yu (2015), it can be assumed that there is a discontinuity in the relationship if H(2)0 is
rejected by the specification test. As the convergence rate of the derived test statistic (Tn)
to a standard normal is slow, they propose approximating the finite-sample distribution
by using the wild bootstrap of Wu (1986) and Liu (1988). The B bootstrap samples
are generated by imposing the null hypothesis; i.e., such that they will mimic the null
distribution of Tn. The null can be rejected if the value of the test statistic Tn exceeds the
upper α-percentile of the resulting empirical distribution in the bootstrap sample T ∗n(αB)
( Tn > T ∗n(αB)).
If H(2)0 , which implies that there is no discontinuity in the relationship, can be rejected
by the specification test, the threshold value c and the discontinuity size τc (the LATE)
can be estimated. The discontinuity point c is thereby determined by
cˆ = arg max
c∈Π
τˆ 2(c),
and thus by checking whether c = xi (xi ∈ Π) maximizes τˆ 2(c), where Π is the search
interval of the assignment variable.
The estimate of τˆ(c), i.e., the non-parametric estimate of the discontinuity in the relation-
ship between y and x at c, is estimated as in the classical RDD literature. Importantly,
Porter and Yu (2015) show that τˆc is a natural by-product of the estimation of the discon-
tinuity point, and that c can be treated as if known when estimating treatment effects in
RDDs. It is therefore not necessary to correct the inference for the fact that the threshold
is an estimate itself, as the asymptotic distribution of τˆ(cˆ) is the same as if c was known.
Thus, after the estimation of c, one can perform a standard RDD analysis.
For the point estimates in our analysis, we follow, e.g., Hahn et al. (2001), Porter (2003)
and Imbens and Lemieux (2008) and estimate the limits by a local linear regression (LLR)
of the form
yi = α + β(moving_datei − cˆ) + i.
using a uniform kernel, as in the specification testing.
A peculiarity of using moving dates as assignment variable is that it is necessary to control
for periodical patterns before running the analysis (Davis, 2008; Paola et al., 2012). We
take these potential periodical patterns in moving dates into account by controlling for
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a battery of indicator variables, i.e. month, day of the month, and the weekday of the
movement fixed effects. As often done in RDD studies, we first run a linear regression of
the dependent variable on covariates. Subsequently, the residual of this regression is used
as the dependent variable in our analysis (see, e.g., Lee and Lemieux, 2010). For notational
convenience, we will nonetheless refer to our dependent variable as yi or the probability
that an individual moves to a switcher municipality.13 For graphical representation, we
plot a local linear regression of y over x using a rectangular kernel to gain an impression
of the basic relationship and we present a series of validation checks for the identifying
assumptions after presenting the results in Section 7.
5 Data
Our main empirical application draws on administrative data on the whole foreign pop-
ulation in Switzerland for the years between 2006 and 2011, which was kindly provided
by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (BFS) in cooperation with the State Secretariat
for Migration (SEM). We thus rely on high quality data when it comes to individuals’
moving dates.14 We restrict our estimation sample to be the universe of all foreigners in
Switzerland holding either the residence permit B, for temporary residency, or C, for per-
manent residency. We thus exclude foreigners with other types of permits such as asylum
seekers, who are not allowed to choose their location freely. We exclusively use data on
individuals moving within Switzerland, and thus exclude those just immigrating or leav-
ing the country. Moving individuals are assigned to their destination canton. In total,
this sample includes roughly 7,854,025 observations and 559,951 incidences of foreigners
moving.
Further, we use data on municipality characteristics and voting outcomes. This data
is freely available on the website of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. Data on the
municipality tax rates has been kindly provided by Parchet (2014).
6 Results
The results of our empirical analyses are presented in several steps. In a first step, we fol-
low a simple approach using a linear probability model to test whether the location choices
of individuals change systematically after the vote. We then proceed by presenting our
13Appendix C offers additional details on the discontinuity estimation in the context of our analysis.
14When moving within Switzerland foreigners have to register in the new municipality of residence,
as well as to de-register in the former municipality of residence within 14 days. In addition, they have
to provide a copy of the rental contract. This data is then systematically collected by the BFS. As
this registration is an obligation, i.e., a deviation is an offense, and the period is rather close to the
moving date, the registered moving dates should provide us with an accurate representation of the actual
individual moving behavior.
18
-
.
04
-
.
03
-
.
02
-
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
P(
mo
ve
 to
 sw
itc
he
r)
1 m 2 m 3 m 4 m 5 m 6 m 7 m 8 m > 8 m
Months after vote
99% CI 95% CI
(a) Effect on the probability of moving to a
switcher municipality for all cantons
-
.
04
-
.
03
-
.
02
-
.
01
0
.
01
.
02
.
03
.
04
P(
mo
ve
 to
 sw
itc
he
r)
1 m 2 m 3 m 4 m 5 m 6 m 7 m 8 m > 8 m
Months after vote
99% CI 95% CI
(b) Effect on the probability of moving to a
switcher municipality for cantons with a discontinu-
ity
Figure 3 These Figures visualize the estimates presented in Table 1. Row (1) is shown on the
left hand side and row (2) on the right hand side.
main results of the proposed regression discontinuity approach, i.e., pooled estimates of
those cantons for which a discontinuity is detected. In the following discussion section, we
first validate that the change in the relative political position of switcher municipalities is
relevant. Second, we test alternative supply-side explanations of the general phenomenon;
i.e., landlords’ discriminatory behavior and labor market discrimination. Next, we report
the results of the validation of the identifying assumptions of the RDD and perform a
placebo test. Finally, we present some complementary evidence on the development of
housing prices in switcher municipalities after the minaret vote.
The empirical analysis draws initially on data for 22 Swiss cantons.15 We abstain from
testing for a treatment effect in four cantons, namely the cantons of Uri, Obwalden,
Appenzell-Innerrhoden and Geneva. The former three cantons are rather small and,
although we draw on register data, there are too few observations to perform the analysis.
Furthermore, we exclude the canton of Geneva, since no municipality in this canton
accepted the minaret initiative, and thus there is no switcher municipality.
6.1 Results of a simple approach
In a preliminary analysis, we abstract from the reasoning about the time when the new
information about attitudes is incorporated and reflected in moving dates and location
choices, and simply study the probability of moving to a switcher municipality after the
vote on the minaret initiative and test whether this probability declined in the months
after the vote. We fit a linear probability model (OLS) to the observation that someone
15Our empirical strategy draws on the following cantons: Zürich (ZH), Bern (BE), Luzern (LU), Schwyz
(SZ), Nidwalden (NW), Glarus (GL), Zug (ZG), Fribourg (FR), Solothurn (SO), Basel-Stadt (BS), Basel-
Landschaft (BL), Schaffhausen (SH), Appenzell-Ausserrhoden (AR), St. Gallen (SG), Graubünden (GR),
Aargau (AG), Thurgau (TG), Ticino (TI), Vaud (VD), Valais (VS), Neuchâtel (NE), and Jura (JU).
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Table 1 Probability of moving to switcher municipalities after the vote
Dependent variable: Moving to a switcher municipality
Sample post30 post60 post90 post120 post150 post180 post210 post240 post>240
(1) Overall –0.006 0.004 0.003 –0.011** –0.005 –0.010** –0.010** –0.001 0.000
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002)
No. of obs. 156,958
R2 0.0001
F 2.13
(2) Cantons with 0.001 0.002 0.000 –0.019*** –0.019*** –0.018*** –0.020*** –0.004 –0.001
discontinuity (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003)
No. of obs. 103,146
R2 0.0005
F 5.62
(3) Cantons without –0.022*** 0.008 0.009 0.007 0.021*** 0.007 0.010 0.004 0.004
discontinuity (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004)
No. of obs. 53,812
R2 0.0004
F 2.44
Notes: Ordinary least squares estimates of the temporal development of the probability of moving to a
switcher municipality for the sample of all foreigners in the pooled sample of cantons. The post. capture
the coefficients for deviations from the level before the vote for intervals of 30 days (and 120 days for the
last indicator). Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, ***
p < .01.
chooses to locate in a switcher municipality for individuals moving in the two years around
the vote. As any effect might be observable for a limited amount of time only, for example,
due to reactions on the housing market, we choose a flexible specification. Specifically, we
estimate a specification including eight monthly indicators post. for up to 240 days after
the vote. They show how the moving pattern evolves during the eight months after the
vote. We further include one indicator for the period between 240 days up to one year
after the vote. The coefficient of the latter variable post>240 shows whether the probability
to move to a switcher municipality is lower after the vote in the medium-term, i.e., after
eight months. As mentioned before, we correct for possible periodical patterns in the
moving behavior, by using the residual of a regression on month, day of month, and
weekday indicators by canton as the dependent variable.
The results are presented in Table 1 and visualized in Figure 3. Row (1), indicated
by ‘Overall’, shows the model estimate for the 22 cantons in the sample. We observe
systematic drops in the probability that foreigners move to a switcher municipality in the
time frame between four and seven months after the vote. This is consistent with our
main hypothesis and the time lag after the vote fits the institutional feature of a three
months notice period in many rental contracts. The drop of around one percentage point
amounts to a 7.7 percent decline vis-à-vis the fraction of about 13 percent of foreigners
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moving to switcher municipalities before the vote. Given the short-comings of the simple
approach to identify behavioral reactions, a larger effect size is expected in the RDD.
6.2 Main estimates for observed location choices applying the
regression discontinuity approach
In the main analysis, separate analyses are performed for each destination canton of
movers as the threshold date might vary depending on the situation on the housing market
and the institutional variation. The specification tests16 detect a discontinuity in 12
cantons.17 The corresponding results of the specification test are presented in Table E.3
in Appendix E.2. In Appendix D, we perform an exemplary analysis for one canton,
i.e., the canton of Thurgau, to show how the empirical strategy is applied. The null
hypothesis of no effect is not rejected for the remaining ten cantons.18 This does not
necessarily exclude the possibility that foreigners in these cantons also reacted. However,
the situation on the housing market or the incorporation of the new information might
not have followed a pattern which would allow the applied method to capture the effect.
As we learned from the simulation (see Appendix B), our identification strategy requires
some form of rigidity in the rental market, for example a binding notice period, so that
the control and the treatment group can be distinguished. While there is a legal default
for a notice period of three months in rental agreements, actual moving dates (and related
lease payments) are negotiable. So whether the notice period is binding or not depends
to a large extent on whether the old tenant can find a new tenant. This might hold in
a tight market, as well as in one where numerous people simultaneously want to change
their domicile. If tenants intending to move have to wait until the end of their lease, a
possible sign of market rigidity, this should be reflected in cumulated movements at the
end of the month. The moving patterns within cantons could thus provide some indication
about the situation on the rental market (see Figure E.12 and Figure E.13 in Appendix
16Regarding the necessary bandwidth choice in the applied nonparametric procedure, we abstain from
using a technique that either depends on the variance of the assignment variable or cross-validation.
First, our running variable is a date and the variation of such a variable makes no sense. Cross-validation
would be theoretically appealing. However, it is computationally intensive, given the large number
of observations and the simulation-based approach. We rather rely on eye-balling and group cantons
according to size when choosing the bandwidth that is as small as possible but which makes the graphs
reasonably smooth. We start with a bandwidth size of 45 days for the largest cantons ZH, BE, AG,
and VD. This bandwidth size ensures that each estimation includes one beginning and one end of the
month, when relocations are frequent. The next group contains the cantons LU, FR, SO, BL, SG, TG,
TI, and VS for which a bandwidth of 60 days is applied. We use 75 days for the cantons SZ, ZG, BS,
SH,GR, and NE. For the smallest ones, i.e., NW, GL, AR, and JU, a bandwidth of 90 days is chosen.
These bandwidths are used for the RDD graphs, the RDD estimates and the threshold search. As the
bandwidth for the testing has to be considerably smaller than for these estimates, we choose to use half
of it in the testing procedure.
17These cantons are: ZH, BE, SZ, NW, GL, SO, AR, GR, TG, TI, VD, and VS. They cover about 66%
of the moves within our sample period.
18The canton of Zug is a special case where switching municipalities have not changed their relative
position, and thus we are not surprised by not detecting a reaction.
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E.3). While there are clear peaks in the share of moving individuals at the end of each
month in many cantons, there are some cantons (LU, FR, BS, SH, and NE) for which no
distinct periodical pattern is observed. For these latter cantons, also no discontinuity is
detected. The situation on the housing market could thus be one consistent explanation
for why we find discontinuities in some but not all the cantons.
For the 12 cantons with a discontinuity, we potentially are able to separate treated from
untreated individuals and thus estimate the local average treatment effect.19 While this
provides us with a local estimate for the sample at hand, there is no obstacle for its causal
interpretation.
If we again apply the former simple approach to a sample restricted to those cantons
for which a discontinuity is detected, we find stronger drops in the four to seven months
after the vote (see Table 1, row (2)). The estimated coefficients indicate that during
this period the probability of moving to a switcher municipality went down by around 2
percentage points. The estimates are visualized in Figure 3. No clear pattern is observed
in the cantons where no discontinuity has been detected (see row (3)). The probability of
moving to a switcher municipality seems to drop initially during the first month after the
vote. However, it promptly returns to the old level. While these results provide further
evidence that is consistent with our main hypothesis the procedure is still too rough to
capture the full effect, primarily because the time indicators do not separate between
treated and untreated individuals. Moreover, the effects likely do not materialize in all
cantons at the same time, such that an averaging by month leads to an underestimation
of the impact of the revelation of reservations towards foreigners. In the next sections,
we therefore proceed with the proposed RDD approach at the detected threshold dates.
Overall effect at the threshold values
The main results build on a pooled analysis of the data of those cantons for which it is
possible to estimate a discontinuity. The threshold dates are estimated to lie between
about 1 month and 5.5 months after the vote. For observations from each canton, we
center the moving dates at the detected thresholds, such that the resulting threshold for
the pooled results is at zero. Combining data for all moving foreigners, we represent the
main finding in a RDD graph presented in Figure 4.20 A pronounced negative jump at
the threshold is observed. Moreover, the probability of moving to a switcher municipality
seems to return to its former level after some time.
19In our specific setting, the division between treated and untreated individuals is probably not perfect
at the threshold value, as there is most likely no perfect temporal separation between those people who
decided where to move after the new information became available (treated group) and those people
who decided where to move beforehand (control group). Consequently, our estimates should rather be
interpreted as a local intent-to-treat effect.
20The discontinuity estimates and RDD graphs for single cantons are reported in Table E.4 and Fig-
ure E.9 in Appendix E.2. As addressed before, we use the residual of a regression on time indicators to
control for periodical patterns, thus in "normal" times it varies around zero.
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Figure 4 Probability of moving to municipalities revealing stronger reservations against foreign-
ers in the pooled sample of cantons. Local linear smooth of the probability that a foreigner moves
to a switcher municipality separately from both sides of the threshold, and using a bandwidth
of 45 days. The light gray dots represent raw means within bins of 5 days.
Estimating the treatment effect at the threshold as described in Section 4, the estimated
drop in the probability that a foreigner moves to a switcher municipality is about 4 to 8
percentage points, depending on the applied bandwidth.21 The corresponding estimation
results are presented in Table 2. The estimated effect is sizable. Before the threshold
dates, the average probability that foreigners move to a switcher municipality was about
13 percent. The jump at the threshold of about 4 to 8 percentage points, thus amounts
to a drop of about 30 to 60 percent.
Temporal development of the effect
As is evident from Figure 4, the effect fades after some time. To gain an impression of
how long the effect persists, we run a linear regression model including indicators for time
periods after the break on the pooled data for a time span of half a year around the
threshold dates. We estimate a model of the form
yi = β0 +
6∑
k=1
γ(k·30)1(xc,i ≥ (k − 1) · 30 & xc,i < k · 30) + i,
where y is our dependent variable, i.e., the residual of a regression of time fixed effects
on an indicator set to one if an individual moves to a switcher municipality, xc is the
moving date centered at the estimated threshold for the corresponding canton, and k · 30
stands for a number series rising in intervals of 30 days: {0, 30,...,180}. The γ. coefficients
21Note that a decreasing estimate of the discontinuity with increasing bandwidths is consistent with
the fading of the effect over time.
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Table 2 RDD estimates of the probability that foreigners move to municipalities revealing
stronger reservations towards foreigners
Dependent variable: Moving to a switcher municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effect ∆P -0.0824*** -0.0819*** -0.0601*** -0.0389*** -0.0358*** -0.0385***
(0.0112) (0.00997) (0.00804) (0.00698) (0.00628) (0.00566)
P (switch)before 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Bandwidth 45 60 90 120 150 180
N left 5,971 7,415 11,636 16,904 21,278 25,968
N right 5,876 8,156 12,729 17,020 21,232 26,000
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates for different bandwidths in the pooled sample of cantons.
Standard errors in parentheses. P (switch)before refers to the average probability of moving to a switcher
municipality within a range of 60 days before the threshold date for the respective sample. Significance
levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
consequently indicate whether the probability of moving to a switcher municipality is
different from the level before the break within the specified time span. The estimation
results are presented in Table 3. Given that the average probability of moving to a
switcher municipality before the break is about 12.5 percent, the initial decline within the
first month amounts to about 40 percent. It turns out that the effect becomes weaker
over time, as suggested by the graphical evidence. There is no systematic difference in
the level anymore about 150 days, or 5 months, after the break. This leveling off could
occur, because the issue is no longer salient, i.e., expressed attitudes are no longer being
discussed in the media. Alternatively, or in some combination, the housing market could
have adjusted to a new equilibrium in which foreigners are compensated by, for example,
lower rents for their disutility of residing in a municipality in which attitudes towards
them are more negative.
Table 3 Temporal development of the probability that foreigners move to switcher municipalities
Dependent variable: Moving to a switcher municipality
Coef. γ30 γ60 γ90 γ120 γ150 γ180
–0.049*** –0.015*** –0.012** –0.025*** –0.011** –0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
No. of obs. 51,817
R2 0.0019
F 16.18
Notes: Ordinary least squares estimates of the temporal persistence of the effect in the pooled sample
of cantons. The γ. are coefficients capturing the deviations from the level before the break for intervals
of 30 days. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, ***
p < .01.
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Table 4 RDD estimates of reactions in location choices for different groups of foreigners
Dependent variable: Moving to a switcher municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Baseline Temp. residency Perm. residency Non-European European Muslim
Effect ∆P -0.0819*** -0.0841*** -0.0761*** -0.0934*** -0.0795*** -0.0563**
(0.00997) (0.0122) (0.0168) (0.0231) (0.0110) (0.0216)
P (switch)before 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.14 0.1
Bandwidth 60 60 60 60 60 60
N left 7,415 4,441 2,974 1,072 6,340 757
N right 8,156 4,930 3,226 1,170 6,984 899
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates for different subsamples in the pooled sample of cantons.
Standard errors in parentheses. P (switch)before refers to the average probability of moving to a switcher
municipality within a range of 60 days before the threshold date for the respective sample. Significance
levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
We find at least suggestive evidence that the latter adjustment channel is relevant in an
additional analysis described in Section 8, where we try to assess whether housing prices
in switcher municipalities decrease in the aftermath of the vote.
Effects for different groups of foreigners
The vote on the minaret initiative prohibited Muslim communities from constructing
further minarets. The change in the substantive law was thus narrow and affected solely
one particular group within the foreign population of Switzerland. However, the public
discourse was much broader in that it addressed general concerns about migration, as
well as the role of (religious) tolerance and cultural identity in Switzerland. Based on the
content of the initiative, we would expect that foreigners, in particular those with a Muslim
background, experience lower expected identity utility from moving to a municipality
where the initiative had unexpectedly received wide support. However, due to the general
discourse, the outcome of the vote might well have been perceived as a revelation of
attitudes towards foreigners in general. According to our understanding of the event,
we share such an interpretation. Moreover, identity theories predict that other (foreign)
minority groups identify with the beleaguered minority group. Accordingly, similar effects
for different groups of foreigners are expected. This reasoning is in line with the finding
in Rudert et al. (2017), documenting that even foreigners, and in particular highly-skilled
foreigners, who are not directly affected by an anti-immigration vote in Switzerland in
2014 experienced considerable distress in regions where the support for this initiative was
high.
In order to learn about any heterogeneity across groups of foreigners, we re-estimate the
effect for various subsamples of foreigners. As the results in Table 4 show, we find sys-
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tematic effects for foreigners holding either temporary or a permanent residence permit,
for European and non-European foreigners, as well as for foreigners from Muslim coun-
tries.22 This is evidence that the change in perceived attitudes affected the attractiveness
of particular municipalities for the group of foreigners across nationalities and cultural
backgrounds. While the relative magnitude of the effect seems to be strongest for non-
European foreigners, it is still considerable for European foreigners. Overall, according
to our interpretation, the reaction was in response to the unexpectedly revealed negative
perceptions of the native population. The comparatively large reaction of non-Muslims
might thereby be rationalized along two lines of reasoning: First, it has not been equally
easy (or it has been differentially costly) for all groups in the foreign population to react.
Recently immigrated Muslims are often less well educated and economically less well off
than other immigrants, such as work migrants from the rest of Europe. This latter group
of people has relatively more resources (including information) to react in their location
choice. Second, highly-skilled individuals are more sensitive to reservations towards immi-
grants. However, there are fewer highly skilled individuals among the Muslim population
in Switzerland. Both lines of reasoning would be consistent with the observation that all
groups react to a rather similar extent.
Effects for foreigners with different occupational skill levels
So far, the evidence suggests that, in general, residents of Switzerland with a foreign na-
tionality expected to experience a loss in utility if they were to move to a municipality
that unexpectedly revealed increased reservations towards foreigners. However, the effects
might differ depending on individuals’ skill level. Regarding foreigners with a low educa-
tional background, studies investigating the determinants of attitudes towards foreigners
frequently argue that concerns about the welfare system play an important role (see, e.g.,
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; Dustmann and Preston, 2007). Thus, immigrants with a
low level of education, who are more likely to rely on the welfare system, might be the
main targets of negative attitudes towards foreigners. It is, however, open whether they
also experience the highest loss in identity utility when residing in an environment with
strong reservations against foreigners. Instead, foreigners with a high education might
be particularly sensitive towards such reservations. They might be more interested in
politics and more likely to follow the discussion in the media than their less well educated
compatriots (Rudert et al., 2017; Elsayed and De Grip, 2018).
In our data, we have only limited information about the formal education of the individu-
als to test for differential effects across skill levels. Instead, we rely on information about
individuals’ occupations. As the immigration authorities do not collect this information
22We have no information about an individuals’ religious affiliation. Instead, we infer that individuals
originating from countries where Islam is the main religion are more likely to be Muslim. The classification
on the main religion of countries is based on the Cross-National Socio-Economic and Religion Data, 2011
and was downloaded from the Association of Religion Data Archives, www.TheARDA.com.
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systematically, it is only available for about 15% of individuals in our data. We infer peo-
ple’s (occupational) skill level by matching occupations to standards of required formal
education. It is important to note that immigrants work in occupations that do not match
their skill level more often than nationals. Their formal educational degrees might not
be accepted. This might be especially the case for, for example, refugees from developing
countries. Miscategorizations are therefore likely, in particular for people in occupations
with formally low skill requirements. To mitigate this miscategorization problem we use
only individuals originating from countries from which formal education is most likely
accepted in Switzerland. These are the countries of the European-Union and countries
on the American continent, as the United States, Canada, and Brazil. We further in-
clude Australia, and New Zealand. Concentrating on these individuals, we expect that
occupation is a good approximation of the skill level.
We use the ISCO-08 classification of the International Labour Office (2012) to classify
the skill level needed to perform specific occupations. The four point classification con-
siders not only required formal education, but also the task complexity of the respective
occupation. We differentiate between high, upper-medium, medium and low skilled indi-
viduals.23
Table 5 RDD estimates of reactions in location choices for foreigners with different occupational
skill levels
Dependent variable: Moving to a switcher municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Sample High High High Up-med. Up-med. Up-med. Med. Med. Med. Low Low Low
skill skill skill skill skill skill skill skill skill skill skill skill
Effect ∆P -0.203** -0.151** -0.155*** -0.104 -0.0643 -0.0324 -0.109 -0.00349 0.0353 0.0600 0.00904 0.0233
(0.0803) (0.0658) (0.0595) (0.0716) (0.0940) (0.0955) (0.0931) (0.0789) (0.0662) (0.116) (0.0968) (0.0744)
P (switch)before 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08
Bandwidth 60 90 120 60 90 120 60 90 120 60 90 120
N left 77 112 156 33 55 69 70 124 181 50 83 125
N right 65 108 140 31 45 62 82 124 164 51 85 120
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates for different subsamples in the pooled sample of cantons.
Standard errors in parentheses. P (switch)before refers to the average probability of moving to a switcher
municipality within a range of 60 days before the threshold date for the respective sample. Significance
levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
The number of observations in this sample get scarce. Nonetheless we can interpret the
results, presented in Table 5, qualitatively. We find that within this sample of nationalities
23We code somebody as high-skilled if his or her occupation corresponds to an ISCO skill level of
4, i.e., the second stage of tertiary education or first stage of tertiary education (medium duration).
Upper-medium skilled, i.e., ISCO skill level of 3 and thus the first stage of tertiary education (short or
medium duration). Medium skilled people refer to an ISCO skill level of 2, i.e., lower to post-secondary
education. Foreigners considered low-skilled are in an occupation of ISCO skill level 1 which requires
primary education.
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Figure 5 Probability of moving to alternative groups of municipalities. Local linear smooth of
the probability that a foreigner moves to a specific group of municipalities separately from both
sides of the threshold, and using a bandwidth of 45 days. The light gray dots represent raw
means within bins of 5 days.
the high-skilled group is most sensitive to the revelation of new information about citizens’
attitudes towards foreigners. The estimate is significantly different from zero despite the
few observations. For the other groups, the discontinuity estimates seem to fall the lower
the skill level. However, the estimates for these other groups are not significantly different
from zero at conventional levels. These results suggest that the group of high-skilled
immigrants seems to react the most.
7 Discussion
This section contains a discussion of potential challenges to the causal interpretation of
our results and two alternative explanations behind the documented effect, as well as the
validation for the assumptions behind our empirical approach.
7.1 Validation check for the relevance of the change in the relative
political positioning of the switcher municipalities
The definition of the switcher municipalities results in a dichotomous categorization of
municipalities. Accordingly, we see per construction an equivalent positive jump in the
probability of moving to a non-switcher municipality at the threshold, as we saw a nega-
tive one in the probability to move to a switcher municipality. The corresponding pattern
is presented in Figure 5a. RDD estimation results are reported in Table E.5 in columns
1, 2, and 3 in Appendix E.3. Moreover, the classification itself rests on a central argu-
ment emphasizing that the voters in a switcher municipality not only expressed a more
restrictive position towards migration than in the past, but that the swing in expressed
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reservations is also more pronounced than for the average municipality of a canton (sec-
ond condition of the definition for switcher municipalities outlined in Subsection 2.2). In
order to validate the importance of this rank condition, i.e. the fact that it is the relative
position within the choice set that matters, we re-estimate the basic specifications with
the pooled data for an alternative classification of municipalities. We construct the de-
pendent variable such that it captures the probability of moving to a municipality that
has not changed its rank, i.e., its position regarding the support of critical attitudes to-
wards foreigners compared to the other municipalities in the canton. Specifically, we focus
on municipalities that are not switcher municipalities and have not experienced a rank
change. If our findings were driven by a change in the positioning, we would not expect to
see a pronounced jump, either positive or negative, in the probability of moving to these
municipalities at the estimated thresholds. The resulting pattern is presented graphically
in Figure 5b. The results of the RDD estimates are reported in Table E.5 in columns
4, 5, and 6 in Appendix E.3. We do not find a systematic reaction for this category of
municipalities.
In an additional test, we analyze whether the positive jump within the group of non-
switcher municipalities is consistent with our reasoning. We define two further alternative
groups of municipalities, one including non-switcher municipalities with a positive rank
change, and thus a relative right shift, after the vote on the minaret initiative and one
including non-switcher municipalities with a negative rank change, and thus a relative left
shift. Re-estimating the jump in the probability of moving to one of these municipality
types at the threshold, we find that the positive jump in the non-switcher municipali-
ties seems to be driven by municipalities with a negative rank change. The estimation
results can be found in Table E.5, columns 7 to 12 in Appendix E.3. This finding is
consistent with our reasoning that foreigners are deterred from moving to municipalities
revealing reservations, and rather choose to move to municipalities that got relatively
more attractive in this dimension.
We interpret this as further support that the observed negative jump in the probability
of choosing a switcher municipality is driven by a mover’s perception of an unexpected
negative shift in the social attitudes of these municipalities towards foreigners.
7.2 Two alternative supply side explanations
So far, the empirical regularity is interpreted within the theoretical framework based on
demand-side reactions to perceived negative attitudes. However, the observed patterns in
aggregate moving behavior across municipalities would also be consistent with supply-side
reactions. First, native landlords in switcher municipalities might feel free to discrimi-
nate against foreigners, once they are informed about their co-residents’ attitudes towards
immigrants. If this supply-driven explanation holds, native landlords are expected to dis-
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Table 6 RDD estimates of the reaction in location choices for second-generation immigrants
Dependent variable: Moving to a switcher municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Effect ∆P -0.0174 -0.00497 0.00188 0.00144 -0.00911
(0.0359) (0.0280) (0.0240) (0.0214) (0.0195)
P (switch)before 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
Bandwidth 60 90 120 150 180
N left 882 1,342 1,925 2,387 2,921
N right 927 1,436 1,919 2,377 2,845
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates in the pooled sample of cantons. P (switch)before refers to the
average probability of moving to a switcher municipality within a range of 60 days before the threshold
date for the respective sample. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
criminate against foreigners in general. When considering second-generation immigrants
who hold the same foreign names, the same potentially foreign appearance, and the same
residence permit types as their parents, one would thus expect landlords to also - at least
to some extent - discriminate against this group of foreigners. However, if the phenomenon
is primarily demand-driven, a smaller reaction is expected for the second-generation immi-
grants, as they are in general better assimilated. They grew up in the Swiss institutional
environment, for example, being familiar with referendums on migration issues. We are
aware though that this is not a clear-cut test as discrimination might be based on char-
acteristics along which first- and second-generation immigrants differ. The test thus loses
bite if, for example, due to language skills first-generation and second-generation migrants
are differentially discriminated against. To explore differential reactions, we repeat our
estimates for the group of second-generation foreigners, i.e., individuals who were born
in Switzerland but have not been naturalized. Table 6 reports the estimates of the treat-
ment effect. We find a much smaller reaction for second-generation foreigners, whereby no
statistically significant treatment effect is estimated. Together with the preceding finding
that highly skilled foreigners react the most, this suggests to us that the main effect is
primarily demand-driven. The highly skilled (well-payed) foreigners are likely the more
attractive tenants for landlords than the less skilled foreigners, so in case of discrimination
we would expect to see the largest reactions for this latter group.
A second potential supply-side explanation focuses on the labor market. After the ballot,
employers in switcher municipalities might feel free to discriminate against foreign labor,
discouraging immigrants from moving into these municipalities. In order to test this
explanation, we analyze relocations in narrow neighborhoods, as they are less likely to be
due to a job change. Thus, if the effect were driven by labor market discrimination, we
would expect relocations within a narrow radius to be less affected. If, however, the effect
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Table 7 RDD estimates of the reaction in location choices for immigrants moving within a
distance of less than 15 minutes of travel distance
Dependent variable: Moving to a switcher municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Effect ∆P -0.0947*** -0.103*** -0.0835*** -0.0604*** -0.0506*** -0.0460***
(0.0183) (0.0163) (0.0132) (0.0114) (0.0102) (0.00919)
P (switch)before 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14
Bandwidth 45 60 90 120 150 180
N left 2,492 2,992 4,690 6,672 8,286 10,148
N right 2,456 3,354 5,142 6,836 8,533 10,394
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates in the pooled sample of cantons and the sample of individuals
moving within a distance of less than 15 minutes. P (switch)before refers to the average probability of
moving to a switcher municipality within a range of 60 days before the threshold date for the respective
sample. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
is, as we argue, due to the perceived change in attitudes, we would expect the effect to
also be present in movement patterns within a narrow radius. To implement this test, we
repeat our estimates for a subsample of foreigners who move within a narrow radius. The
distance between the old and the new municipality of residence is measured in minutes
of travel time, and we use 15 minutes as a measure of relatively short distance.24 The
results reported in Table 7 show that the effect for this subsample of individuals who
move within a 15-minute radius is very similar to the baseline effect. If anything, it is
slightly stronger. A stronger effect within a narrow radius seems sensible given that it
is less costly to get the information about vote outcomes in the direct surrounding. The
observation that individuals who move within a narrow radius, probably not attributable
to a job change, are just as likely to react as those who move within a wider radius leads
us to the conclusion that labor discrimination most likely cannot explain our finding.
7.3 Validation of the identification assumptions
There are some crucial assumptions that need to hold for a valid RDD setting. In our
setting, they translate to the assumptions that individuals deciding where to move before
or after the vote are on average the same and that the characteristics of switcher munic-
ipalities, except for their voting behavior, have not changed systematically. There is no
formal test for this assumption and we do not observe the date of the moving decision.
However, most RDD studies check whether individual characteristics are balanced around
the threshold to validate it. We, in a first step, follow this strategy and estimate a sharp
RDD, taking some individual characteristics, which are available in our data (i.e., age,
24Travel time is collected using Stata’s Traveltime3 command (Bernhard, 2013), which retrieves travel
time between two locations from Google Maps.
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civil status, duration of stay in CH, citizenship of parents, and individuals’ skill level), as
dependent variables and using the estimated threshold date as threshold value. We report
the results of this exercise in Table E.6 in Appendix E.2. We find only one significant
estimate for age and a bandwidth of 45 days. As it is not robust to the bandwidth choice
and seems to be rather small we are not alarmed that our results might be driven by this
difference. We do not find systematic differences in the other individual characteristics
around the threshold.
We secondly test, whether the characteristics of the switcher municipalities have not
changed systematically after the vote in 2009. Table E.7 in Appendix E.2 reports the
results of the corresponding validation estimates. While most characteristics have not
systematically changed, we find evidence for two systematic changes: on the one hand,
there is a decrease in the resident population, and on the other hand, there is a slight
increase in the rate of vacant apartments in switcher municipalities. Both findings are
rather complementary evidence in support of our main hypothesis, as they are consistent
with the observed individual reactions of foreigners. It can be expected that there will
be, at least temporarily, more vacant apartments if a sizable group of the population
shuns switcher municipalities. When we study the number of Swiss and foreign residents
separately, we find that the point estimate is larger for foreigners. The reduction in the
number of Swiss citizens in switcher municipalities further suggests that there might be
a group of Swiss citizens that reacts to the newly revealed information as well. This
effect might be driven by naturalized immigrants, who we do not observe in our data, or
by native citizens, who care about their neighbors’ attitudes in this dimension. Overall,
the observation suggests some form of general preference-based spatial sorting. While it
would be interesting to investigate the individual reactions for Swiss citizens in a separate
analysis, corresponding individual level data for Swiss citizens is not available.
A third implication of our design is that there is no change in the probability of moving
due to the event. It is important that this condition holds, for example, because a large
increase in the prevalence of moving within the group of non-switcher municipalities would
be reflected in a relative decline in the probability of moving to a switcher municipality. In
order to investigate how many foreigners move per day around the threshold, we generate
counts of movers within each canton and moving date. This approach again requires that
we control for periodical patterns before running the analysis. There are dates at which
it is much more likely to observe individuals moving due to the municipalities’ mandatory
moving dates and contractual arrangements on tenancy changeover.25 We first estimate
25 We again follow, for example, Davis (2008) in controlling for these periodical patterns by using a
battery of indicator variables. We first run the specification
yt = β0 + βxt + ut,
where the dependent variable is yt, the number of moving individuals at a certain date t, and xt includes
indicator variables for months, the day of the month and weekdays. We estimate over the period between
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a sharp RDD on the number of foreigners moving in general. The corresponding RDD
graph is presented in Figure E.10a in Appendix E.3. The results for two bandwidths are
reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table E.8 in Appendix E.2. We find no significant change in
the number of movers. Second, we repeat the exercise using counts of individuals leaving
switcher municipalities. The graphical evidence is presented in Figure E.10b in Appendix
E.3, and the corresponding estimates are reported in columns 3 and 4 of Table E.8 in
Appendix E.2. As before, we do not find a systematic change in the probability that
a foreigner moves from this group of municipalities. The latter finding could also be
interpreted as evidence that the interaction between foreigners and citizens in switcher
municipalities has not radically changed after the vote. If it had, we would expect to see
foreigners leaving these municipalities. Third, we check whether the aggregate data still
allows us to detect the pattern we found in the individual data. We repeat the estimation
using the residual counts of individuals moving to a switcher municipality. As is evident
from the estimates in columns 5 and 6 of Table E.8 in Appendix E.2 (see also Figure E.11
in Appendix E.3), a drop in the probability of moving to a switcher municipality is still
observed. Foreigners shun switcher municipalities after the vote.
Finally, as in many RDD studies, we run a placebo test by repeating the test procedure
for the same time periods in the previous year (-365 days). We cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no treatment effect in either of the cantons, and thus find no indication for
a discontinuity the year before. Results for this placebo test are reported in Table E.3
in Appendix E.2. This test also indicates that our results are most likely not driven by
periodical moving patterns.
8 Complementary evidence on the development of hous-
ing prices
The empirical findings indicate a fading out of the effect of the unexpectedly revealed
reservations towards foreigners in switcher municipalities. While this fading might be
due to reduced salience over time, theoretical models of the housing market would rather
predict a market reaction. In particular, the reduced inflow is expected to lead to a drop in
relative housing prices in these municipalities. Given the regulations of the Swiss rental
market, any market reactions, however, are expected to be primarily confined to new
rental contracts and property transfers. In order to test this complementary hypothesis,
we draw on data of rental prices and selling prices for private apartments and houses from
online advertisements collected on all major Swiss online platforms. We use 332,343 price
quotes for the period between January 2006 and November 2010, i.e., up to one year after
2006 and 2008, thus before the event, in order to control for moving behavior in normal times. We then
predict the residual ut for the entire time period and use it as our dependent variable. For convenience,
we still refer to this variable as the number of moving individuals.
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the vote. The data on rental as well as selling prices are per square meter (and per month
for rental objects) for apartments and houses with one to seven rooms. They are linked to
time according to the online announcement date of the respective add. In our estimation
sample, the average rental price per square meter is 21.61 Swiss Francs and the average
selling price about 5,174.85 Swiss Francs. We use a difference-in-differences (DID) type
approach to evaluate whether prices change systematically in switcher municipalities. We
estimate a linear regression model including time indicators for eight monthly periods
after the vote to capture the development of any effect on prices. A separate indicator
for the remaining four months in the first year after the vote captures the change in
the "equilibrium" price. We separately analyze rental and selling announcements, as
market reactions might differ in time. Given the integration of the housing market, the
magnitude of any detected change in (relative) prices depends on the chosen comparison
groups. In order to capture a possible drop in housing prices in switcher municipalities,
we compare them to prices in municipalities that did barely change their position in the
municipality ranking with regard to reservations towards foreigners.26 It is important
to note that, there is no control group in a DID sense in our setting. In principle all
non-switcher municipalities are also treated and market adjustments could be expected.
However, as we want to capture whether prices start diverging, we consider this group
of municipalities to be the most valid comparison group, as we observe little change in
the inflow of foreigners after the minaret vote in these municipalities. In contrast, we
would expect relative price changes to be largest vis-à-vis municipalities that became
relatively more open and experienced an increase in foreigners moving in. However, in
this latter case, (relative) prices might change primarily due to price movements in the
municipalities that experienced a higher inflow. We therefore concentrate on the former
comparison group in our DID analysis and investigate how prices diverge.
The estimation results are reported in Table E.9 and the temporal evolvement of the
raw means of prices is presented in Figure E.14 in the Appendix. In order to control
for general level differences and time patterns in the price announcements, we perform
the estimates correcting for municipality, month, day of month, weekday, and year fixed
effects. We perform one overall estimation and two separate ones, one for cantons in which
we found a discontinuity in location choices and one for those for which our approach did
not detect a sharp reaction. Further, we report separate estimations for rental and selling
prices. The ‘Switch∗post.’ interactions capture whether the price evolvement of switcher
municipalities differs from that of the comparison municipalities. We find that newly
announced rental prices start systematically diverging between switcher municipalities
and the relative stable comparison municipalities only a few months after the minaret
vote. Towards the end of the first year after the vote, the difference, on average, amounts
to roughly 1.0 Swiss Francs (or to 4.6% when compared to the average price of 21.61 Swiss
26More specifically, we choose those municipalities that changed their position in the ranking by only
up to two steps.
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Francs) for rental prices and to about 258.2 Swiss Francs (or to 4.9% when compared to the
average price of 5,174.85 Swiss Francs) for selling prices respectively. While the estimated
effects are larger for switcher municipalities in cantons where a discontinuity has been
detected, we also observe a drop in prices, which is smaller, in the switcher municipalities
of the remaining cantons. While we do not want to overstate the results from this simple
analysis, they suggest that there was some systematic reaction in housing prices. The price
reaction is consistent with our main result that foreigners shun switcher municipalities
after the surprising revelation of negative attitudes towards foreigners. Moreover, it points
to an interpretation of the overall phenomenon as a demand side reaction.
9 Concluding remarks
This paper uses the vote on the Swiss minaret initiative in 2009 as a natural experiment
to identify the effect of newly revealed reservations towards immigrants on their location
choices. A simple before after comparison suggests that the probability of foreigners
moving to a municipality that unexpectedly revealed stronger negative attitudes towards
them is reduced in the time after the vote. In a refined analysis, we exploit the quasi-
random variation in the exact date of individuals’ decision to move applying a RDD with
unknown discontinuity points. We find discontinuities in the probability of foreigners
moving to a municipality which had unexpectedly revealed strong reservations against
immigrants for 12 out of 22 cantons. The estimated reaction is sizable. The probability of
an immigrant relocating to a switcher municipality drops initially, on average, by about
40 percent. This initial effect levels off over a period of 5 months before it vanishes.
The reaction is not confined to Muslims or non-European immigrants, but also holds for
European immigrants. The latter finding is in line with research on ostracism and the
rejection-identification model in social psychology which asserts that minority groups tend
to identify with other minority groups when the latter are under threat and that even a
vague feeling of being ostracized can produce psychological distress. Moreover, foreigners
in high-skill occupations react more strongly than foreigners in medium- and low-skill
occupations. Well-educated immigrants therefore seem to be particularly sensitive to
reservations towards foreigners. This observation highlights a tension when countries try
to attract highly-skilled professionals from abroad.
Complementary evidence suggests that this leveling off is due to a market reaction, as
rental and selling prices for apartments and houses in switcher municipalities fall by
roughly 5% within a year vis-à-vis municipalities that neither became relatively more or
less tolerant towards foreigners. Our data does not allow us to test whether this latter
effect is partly due to a systematic reaction in the location choices of Swiss citizens. A
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reaction of Swiss citizens is well conceivalbe and refers to a more general preference-based
spatial sorting with respect to expressed attitudes at the ballot box.
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Appendix
A Campaign poster and media reporting of the vote
outcome
Figure A.1 Campaign poster in support of the minaret initiative.
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Figure A.2 Local media reporting about the vote on the minaret initiative. The excerpt of
an article from the Swiss newspaper Tages-Anzeiger entitled "Land sagte Ja, Städte Nein"
(November 30, 2009) shows how the outcome of the vote on the minaret initiative was visualized
in the press.
Figure A.3 Local media reporting about the vote outcomes at the voting district level. The
graph was presented in the Swiss newspaper Tages-Anzeiger in the article entitled "Warum die
Schwamendinger anders ticken als der Durchschnittszürcher" (November 30, 2009) , it depicts
the outcome of the vote on the minaret initiative at the level of voting districts within Zurich.
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B Simulation of a simple location search with overlap-
ping search generations
How does the inflow of people with particular preferences into a municipality change when
the municipality becomes less attractive for them? An ex ante understanding is necessary
in order to choose appropriate econometric techniques when analyzing data about moving
behavior to test hypotheses about location choices. This also holds in the context of our
analysis concerning the effect of the revelation of negative attitudes towards foreigners on
immigrants’ location choices.
Whereas our theoretical model is about location decisions, our empirical data is restricted
to information about moving dates. It is thus ex ante unclear how the incorporation of
the new information about attitudes towards foreigners is reflected in moving patterns
after the vote on the minaret initiative. As it can be considered random whether an
individual makes his or her location choice immediately before or after the polling day,
a regression discontinuity design could be applied regarding the decision to locate in a
switcher municipality with the polling day as the threshold date. However, actual moves
materialize only after a decision has been made, and we do not know when people made
their location decisions. We therefore have to decide whether we would predict that
an unexpected negative change in a municipality’s attitudes towards foreigners (switcher
municipality) would elicit a sharp drop in the probability of foreigners choosing to move
to that municipalities or whether we, instead, predict that a gradual transition to a new
equilibrium takes place.
To asses how the effect might materialize, we perform a simulation analysis of individual
location choices. We simulate a simple location search with overlapping search generations
to evaluate which incorporation pattern we would expect. We assume as given that only
those individuals who search a location after the vote can incorporate the information
about revealed attitudes into their choice. We generate a population of 3,500 observations
and randomly assign a point in time at which they decide to relocate. We assume that
individuals terminate the contract with their landlord as soon as they have decided to move
and start to search for an alternative apartment. The probability of a searcher finding
an apartment on each successive day after starting their search is set to 0, 015, such that
the average search length is 66, 66 days. In the baseline setting, the probability that the
apartment lies in a switcher municipality is 0.5. The new information enters the system
at time t0 = 350 and reduces the probability of choosing a switcher municipality by τ =
−0.25. We simulate the location search, once with search frictions alone, i.e., individuals
move at the point in time in which they find an apartment, and once considering a notice
period of 3 months (or 90 days) assuming that individuals cannot move before 90 days
after starting their search even if they find housing before this limit. The two scenarios
mark the extreme cases in terms of the transaction costs related to moving. While these
43
New information
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
P(
mo
ve
 to
 sw
itc
he
r)
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Moving date
(a) without a binding notice period
New information
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
P(
mo
ve
 to
 sw
itc
he
r)
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800
Moving date
(b) with a binding notice period
Figure B.4 Simulated probability of moving to a switcher municipality. Local linear smooth of
the probability that an individual chooses to move to a switcher municipality over the moving
date using a bandwidth of 60 days.
costs are assumed minimal in the first scenario, they are assumed to be maximal in the
second. Movers cannot afford to rent two apartments at the same time and do not find
follow-up tenants. Based on the two scenarios, we compare how the new information
is incorporated and reflected in the pattern of the probability of moving to a switcher
municipality over time.
Figure B.4a visualizes the resulting pattern without a notice period, estimated by a local
linear smooth (LLS). The straight line indicates the point in time in which the new
information enters the system. The effect seems to be incorporated gradually, and it
takes some time until the probability of choosing a switcher municipality stabilizes at
its new equilibrium. Figure B.4b shows the resulting picture if a notice period is taken
into account. It again takes some time until the new equilibrium is reached. However,
the new information is incorporated with a time lag and the pattern reveals a much
steeper decline in the probability of moving to a switcher municipality. The effect of
the information seems to cause a sharp drop in the probability of moving to a switcher
municipality, rather than a gentle decline as in the case when the information is gradually
incorporated. As notice periods are very common in Switzerland (and the default option
in rental agreements), we think that the second pattern of information incorporation is
realistic with regard to our application, and in the choice of econometric techniques for
the empirical analysis.
Assuming that it is random when individuals choose to relocate and find an apartment,
a regression discontinuity framework is suitable to analyze the incorporation of the new
information. The probability of moving to a switcher municipality seems to drop sharply
once the new information takes effect on individuals’ relocation behavior. This sharp drop,
if it really exists, can be measured by estimating a jump or a discontinuity. However, the
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Figure B.5 Simulated probability of moving to a switcher municipality (with a binding notice
period). Local linear smooth of the probability that an individual chooses to move to a switcher
municipality over the moving date separately from both sides of the estimated threshold date,
and using a bandwidth of 60 days.
exact date when the jump materializes is not known. We, therefore, apply a regression
discontinuity design with unknown discontinuity points to test whether the relationship
features a discontinuity and to determine its position. This method is discussed in detail
in Appendix C on the empirical strategy. For the particular run of the simulation, there
is a discontinuity at t = 442 for the notice period scenario.
Re-estimating the relationship using LLS separately from both sides of the estimated
threshold, we find in Figure B.5 that the probability of choosing a switcher municipality
features a clear negative jump at the threshold value. To gain an idea why the jump
mostly appears when a notice period is considered, we decompose the distributions of the
moving dates. We separate between individuals who decided to relocate before the new
information entered the system and those who decided to relocate afterwards. Figure B.6b
shows the resulting densities for the scenario considering a notice period. We see that
the estimated threshold date is temporally close to the point in time at which the movers
who decided on the basis of the new information outweigh those who decided without it.
Furthermore, the densities show steep slopes just before the threshold date. Thus, the
change in the composition of the population regarding individuals with and without the
new information occurs quite abruptly. The transition period in the baseline scenario, see
Figure B.6a, is wider. The densities have a less steep slope in the period after the new
information is released. This explains why the effect materializes much more smoothly
than in the scenario with the notice period in most simulation runs.
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Figure B.6 Composition of the pool of individuals moving regarding their information level.
Kernel density estimates.
In a last step, we repeat the procedure of drawing a population and testing for the presence
of a jump in the resulting moving pattern 500 times. Table B.1 summarizes the results of
this simulation. We find a discontinuity in 82 percent of the draws in the notice period
setting. In contrast, it is only found in about 26 percent of cases in the setting with search
frictions alone.
Table B.1 Test results for discontinuities detected in simulated data
Mean SD Min. Max. N
Without notice period
Discontinuity detected 0.26 0.44 0 1 500
Threshold 399.04 31.01 360 499 128
τ at threshold –0.16 0.11 –0.29 0.26 128
With notice period
Discontinuity detected 0.82 0.38 0 1 500
Threshold 440.84 13.72 360 495 412
τ at threshold –0.23 0.08 –0.42 0.36 412
Note: Summary of simulation results, once without notice period and once considering a notice period
of 90 days.
The regression discontinuity method with unknown discontinuity points thus seems an
appropriate econometric technique for analyzing information effects on moving patterns
in a context with notice periods.
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C Regression discontinuity designs with unknown dis-
continuity points
This section describes how we implement the regression discontinuity design with unknown
discontinuity points proposed in Porter and Yu (2015) in applied empirical work.
In our application and this description, we concentrate on the sharp design. We further
only describe our proceedings for the case with one discontinuity point, even though their
approach allows for multiple discontinuity points.27
The relationship of interest between the dependent variable y and the running variable x
when estimating a RDD can be expressed by the following reduced-form expression:
y = m(x) +  = mc(x) + τcdc + .
Where m(x) is some function of x, dc is a treatment indicator (d = 1(x > c)), E[|x, dc] =
0 and τc is the potential treatment effect at the threshold c. mc(x) = m(x) − τcdc and
c ∈ Π = [c, c].
The starting point of the procedure is to test whether there is a discontinuity in the
relationship. Therefore the proposed approach by Porter and Yu (2015) first tests two
hypotheses in order to disentangle whether there is a selection effect, a treatment effect,
both, or neither of the two:
H
(1)
0 : no effects
H
(1)
1 : selection only (2)
H
(2)
0 : no effects & selection only
H
(2)
1 : treatment effect only & both selection and treatment effect. (3)
They further propose conducting these tests sequentially and starting with the test of
(3). If H(2)0 cannot be rejected, a test of (2) could be performed. They develop a test
statistic for which the only difference in testing (2) or (3) is the choice of a different
smoothing parameter.28 The bandwidth in testing (2) should be considerably larger than
the bandwidth in testing (3). As we are interested exclusively in cases where there is a
treatment effect, we only test (3). If H(2)0 cannot be rejected, we abstain from further
analysis. According to the approach by Porter and Yu (2015), it can be assumed that
there is a discontinuity in m(x) if H(2)0 is rejected by the specification test. It can be
proceeded with the estimation of the threshold value c. Once c is known, the size of the
27A discussion of the fuzzy case and an in-depth discussion of the theoretical derivations and the method
are presented in the original paper (Porter and Yu, 2015).
28When testing (2), m(x) is estimated non-parametrically, thereby overersmoothing the estimate so
that the resulting bias generates power. When testing (3), however, m(x) is undersmoothed, and the bias
in the selection case will disappear asymptotically, while a jump in m(x) would still generate power.
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discontinuity τc can be estimated. Before discussing these latter aspects, we describe how
the specification test is performed by simulating the empirical distribution of the test
statistic under the null to find critical values.
Consider the relationship between y and x as
y = m(x) + e. (4)
Under H(1)0 E[e|x] = E[|x] = 0 for x ∈ Π and under H(1)1 E[e|x] 6= 0. By observing that
E[eE[e|x]1Πx ] = E[E[e|x]21Πx ] = E[(m(x) − m(x))21Πx ] ≥ 0 and that the equality only
holds if H(1)0 is true, they construct a consistent test for (2) based on E[eE[e|x]]1Πx . ei
is estimated by the nonparametric residual from (4) (eˆi = yi − yˆi) and E[ei|xi]f(xi) by a
kernel estimator. yˆi is a kernel estimator of m(xi) defined as
yˆi =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
yjLb,ij/fˆi,
and fˆi is estimated by
fˆi =
1
n− 1
∑
j 6=i
Lb,ij,
where Lb,ij = 1b l(
xi−xj
b
) is a second-order kernel29 and b is the bandwidth. Note that
(xi, yi) is excluded in estimating m(xi). E[ei|xi]fi is estimated by 1n−1
∑
j 6=i eˆjLh,ij1
Π
j .
Finally, the test statistic is based on
In =
nh1/2
n(n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
1Πi 1
Π
j Lh,ij eˆieˆj.
Under H(1)0 , eˆi is a good estimator for i, but under H
(1)
1 it includes a bias in the neigh-
borhood of c. This generates power.
The asymptotic variance of the test statistic can be consistently estimated by
v2n =
2h
n(n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
1Πi 1
Π
j L
2
h,ij eˆ
2
i eˆ
2
j
for the testing of both hypotheses. The resulting studentized test statistic is Tn = In/vn.
As the convergence rate of Tn to a standard normal is very slow, they propose approxi-
mating the finite-sample distribution by using the wild bootstrap of Wu (1986) and Liu
(1988). The bootstrap samples are generated by imposing the null hypothesis; i.e., such
that they will mimic the null distribution of Tn. The algorithm is specified as follows:
Step 1: Generate the two-point wild bootstrap residual for i = 1, ..., n. ∗i = eˆi(1 −
√
5)/2
with probability (1 +
√
5)/(2
√
5), and ∗i = (1 +
√
5)/2 with probability (
√
5 −
1)/(2
√
5). Then E∗[∗i ] = 0 and E∗[∗i ] = eˆ∗i .30
29Please note that we use a uniform or rectangular kernel for the specification testing and the estimation
of cˆ in our application. We do not want to give too much weight to single days because of the possible
periodical patterns in individuals’ moving behavior.
30Note that ∗i is, in effect, simulated based on the centered eˆi, eˆi = eˆi− eˆ. For more details, see Porter
and Yu (2015).
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Step 2: Generate the bootstrap resample {y∗i , xi}ni=1 by y∗i = yˆi + ∗i . Only data with xi ∈
[c − b, c + b] are needed to construct I∗n. Then calculate the bootstrap residuals
eˆ∗i = y
∗
i − yˆ∗i .31
Step 3: Use the resulting samples to calculate the test statistic T ∗n = I∗n/v∗n using the same
bandwidths as in the estimation of Tn. Where
I∗n =
nh1/2
n(n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
1Πi 1
Π
j Lh,ij eˆ
∗
i eˆ
∗
j
and
v∗2n =
2h
n(n− 1)
∑
i
∑
j 6=i
1Πi 1
Π
j L
2
h,ij eˆ
∗2
i eˆ
∗2
j .
Step 4: Repeat the three former steps B32 times and use the resulting empirical distribution
to approximate the null distribution of Tn. H0 can consequently be rejected if
Tn > T
∗
n(αB). T
∗
n(αB) is the upper α-percentile of the empirical distribution of T
∗
n .
If H(2)0 , which implies that there is no discontinuity in the relationship, can be rejected by
the specification test, the threshold value c and the discontinuity size τc can be estimated.
Porter and Yu (2015) determine the discontinuity point by
cˆ = arg max
c∈Π
τˆ 2(c),
and thus by checking whether c = xi (xi ∈ Π) maximizes τˆ 2(c).
The estimate of τˆ(c), i.e., the nonparametric estimate of the discontinuity in the rela-
tionship between y and x at c, is thereby estimated as in the classical RDD literature.
Importantly, Porter and Yu (2015) show that τˆc is a natural by-product of the estimation
of the discontinuity point, and that c can be treated as if known when estimating treat-
ment effects in RDDs. The asymptotic distribution of τˆ(cˆ) is the same as if c were known.
After the estimation of c, one can perform a standard RDD analysis.
C.1 Estimation in the regression discontinuity design
We briefly describe how we estimate the local average treatment effect (LATE) in our
RDD33 setting with time as the assignment variable, given that the null hypothesis of no
treatment effect could be rejected and the threshold value was determined.34
31yˆ∗i is defined as yˆi, except that yi in (4) is replaced by y∗j .
32In our application, B is set to 1, 500.
33A practical guide for the estimation of a RDD is provided by Imbens and Lemieux (2008).
34There are few studies that use time as the assignment variable so far. Davis (2008) is, to our
knowledge, the first. He uses the introduction date of a program aimed at reducing pollution in Mexico
City as the threshold. Another example is the study by Paola et al. (2012). They use a RDD approach
over time to investigate the effect of the introduction of a system with penalty points for driving offenses
in Italy. They identify the causal effect of the new system on road safety.
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A peculiarity of using moving dates as assignment variable is that it is necessary to con-
trol for periodical patterns before running the analysis. We control for these potential
periodical patterns in moving dates by controlling for a battery of indicator variables, i.e.
month, day of the month, and the weekday of the movement fixed effects. As often done
in RDD studies, we first run a linear regression of the dependent variable on covariates.
Subsequently, the residual of this regression is used as the dependent variable in our anal-
ysis (see, e.g., Lee and Lemieux, 2010).35 For notational convenience, we will nonetheless
refer to our dependent variable as yi or the probability that an individual moves to a
switcher municipality.
Given that the necessary assumptions for a sharp RDD hold, the treatment effect τ can
be estimated by the following limits36¤ E(τi|xi = c) = ¤ lim
x→c+
E(yi|xi = x)− ¤ lim
x→c−
E(yi|xi = x). (5)
Where y stands for the dependent variable, x represents the assignment variable (in our
application the moving date), limx→c− stands for the limit approaching the threshold from
the left, and limx→c+ , the limit coming from the right.
For the point estimates in our analysis, we follow Hahn et al. (2001) and Porter (2003) and
estimate the limits in (5) by a local linear regression (LLR) using a uniform kernel, as in
the specification testing.37 To obtain, for example, an estimator for limx→c− E(yi|xi = x),
i.e., to the left of the threshold, a local polynomial regression with a constant term with
coefficient αY l (l for left) and a linear term in xc with coefficient βY l, to correct for the
influence of xc on the outcome, is specified (yi = αyl+βylxci+i). Thereby, xc corresponds
to the forcing variable x centered at the threshold c (xc = x−c). This estimation includes
all data points within the range x − h ≤ x < c (or xc − h ≤ xc < 0). The estimate αˆyl
35We first run the specification
yi = β0 + β1xi + ui,
where yi is our dependent variable and thus an indicator of whether an individual moved to a switcher
municipality. The variable xi includes indicator variables for the month, the day of the month, and the
weekday of the movement. We perform this procedure separately for each canton and use data between
2006 and 2008 for the estimation. We then predict the residual ui for the whole time span and use it as
our dependent variable.
36The identification of a treatment effect in a RDD setting is only possible at x = c, i.e., a LATE is
identified at x = c (Hahn et al., 2001).
37Since the LLR framework is well understood, our analysis, like many others, abstains from applying
a more complicated model (such as the GAM) and uses a linear probability model, which directly models
P (Y = 1) = X ′β. This model can be directly estimated using LS, or LLR in the present case. The
drawbacks of this approach are clear. Using this linear model, it is possible to obtain predicted proba-
bilities below zero or above one, which is at odds with the definition of a probability. However, in many
applications this approach seems to be a useful simplification (see, e.g., Cameron and Trivedi, 2005, p.
466ff.).
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then emerges from the solution to the following minimization problem
min
αyl;βyl
N∑
i=1
(yi − αyl − βylxci)2Kh (xci − 0) I(xci < 0)
(Hahn et al., 2001). The analogous procedure is applied for the estimation of the other
limit in equation (5). h represents the suitable bandwidth h > 0 and Kh (xi − c), the
kernel weighting function, defined as Kh (xi − c) = 1hK
(
xi−c
h
)
. The treatment effect
estimator in the sharp RDD is given by τˆ = τˆc = αˆyr − αˆyl.
The specification for the estimation on both sides of the determined threshold can be
formulated as
yi = α + β(moving_datei − cˆ) + i.
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D Exemplary analysis for a single canton
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Figure D.7 Probability of moving to a switcher municipality in the canton of Thurgau. Local
linear smooth of the probability that a foreigner moves to a switcher municipality, using a
bandwidth of 30 days. The light gray dots represent raw means within bins of 15 days.
In order to provide an intuition for the application of the methodology used, we exemplify
our econometric proceeding for the canton of Thurgau (TG). The dependent variable of
interest is an indicator of whether a moving individual chooses to locate in a switcher
municipality.38
We first visually inspect how the probability that a foreigner chooses to move to one of
the switcher municipalities evolves over time, whereby we undersmooth the estimate using
the same bandwidth as in the specification testing. As can be seen in Figure D.7, the
probability is rather stable until the vote, which is marked by the solid vertical line. Some
time after the vote has taken place, the probability seems to drop temporarily. For the
detection of a possible threshold, we define a time span within which we expect the jump
to occur, if there is one. This time span is marked by the two dashed vertical lines.
We perform the specification test as described in Section 4 (or in Appendix C in more
detail); i.e., testing the null hypothesis of no treatment effect, within the defined time
span. We find that the null hypothesis is rejected for this canton. The test statistic is
2.62 and exceeds the critical value of 0.79 at the 5% significance level. These results are
also listed in Table E.3 in Appendix E.2. The estimated threshold date for the canton
of Thurgau is March 2, 2010 and, thus about 3 months after the vote has taken place.
We proceed with a classical RDD analysis and plot a local linear smooth separately from
both sides of the estimated threshold. In Figure D.8, a negative jump in the probability
38As addressed before, we use the residual of a regression on time indicators to control for periodical
patterns, thus in "normal" times it varies around zero.
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Figure D.8 Probability of moving to a switcher municipality in the canton of Thurgau - RDD
graph around the threshold date March 2, 2010. Local linear smooth of the probability that a
foreigner moves to a switcher municipality separately from both sides of the threshold, and using
a bandwidth of 60 days. The light gray dots represent raw means within bins of 15 days.
that a foreigner chooses to locate in a switcher municipality is observed at the estimated
threshold date. Moreover, it seems that the effect fades and that after some time the
probability that a foreigner moves to a switcher municipality returns to its former level.
When we estimate the treatment effect at the detected threshold, we find a statistically
significant negative discontinuity at the particular date. The probability of moving to a
switcher municipality drops by 16 percentage points at the threshold. The details of the
estimation result are listed in Table E.4 in Appendix E.2.
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E Additional results
E.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table E.2 Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean SD Median Min Max N
Switcher and Non-switcher municipalities in 2009
Switcher 0.24 - - 0 1 2,515
Mean vote shares former
All 50.82 12.6 52.48 13.98 85.33 2,515
Switcher 46.05 9.93 47.01 13.98 64.08 612
Non-switcher 52.35 12.98 54.82 14.8 85.33 1,903
Mean vote shares 2009
All 63.26 10.71 64.1 25 100 2,515
Switcher 63.34 7.18 63.55 50 87.5 612
Non-switcher 63.24 11.62 64.3 25 100 1,903
∆ =(vote share 2009 - mean vote shareformer)
All 12.44 7.57 12 -23.9 49.15 2,515
Switcher 17.29 7.25 17.14 3.25 49.15 612
Non-switcher 10.88 6.98 10.63 -23.9 39.08 1,903
rank change
All -0.3 48.39 -1 -294 299 2,515
Switcher 39.91 50.60 21.5 -8 299 612
Non-switcher -13.23 39.81 -6 -294 131 1,903
Notes: Summary statistics for the main variables for the municipality classification.
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E.2 Results for the individual cantons
Table E.3 Results for the specification test and the estimated threshold dates
Original Placebo
Canton htest Tn T ∗n(90B) T
∗
n(95B) h Date cˆ Tn T
∗
n(90B) T
∗
n(95B)
ZH 22.5 1.07 0.45 1.089 45 Jan 06, 2010 -0.695 0.294 0.655
BE 22.5 2.245 0.559 1.702 45 Feb 06, 2010 -2.227 0.248 0.672
SZ 37.5 4.768 0.796 1.751 75 May 13, 2010 -1.863 0.567 1.308
NW 45 2.405 0.583 0.952 90 Dec 21, 2009 -0.556 0.717 1.155
GL 45 0.777 0.38 0.764 90 Jan 08, 2010 -2.619 1.007 1.398
SO 30 2.191 0.864 1.441 60 Mar 18, 2010 1.229 2.265 2.752
AR 45 3.327 0.837 1.398 90 May 16, 2010 -0.249 0.674 1.228
GR 37.5 1.358 0.626 0.913 75 Mar 11, 2010 0.164 0.564 0.926
TG 30 2.624 0.272 0.796 60 Mar 02, 2010 -1.211 0.39 0.658
TI 30 2.15 0.434 1.01 60 Mar 18, 2010 -3.043 0.083 0.518
VD 22.5 1.866 1.46 2.442 45 Feb 18,2010 -3.248 0.332 0.631
VS 30 2.471 0.348 0.625 60 Jan 08, 2010 0.369 0.437 0.76
LU 30 -2.442 0.677 1.023 60 -
ZG 37.5 -3.919 0.768 0.986 75 -
FR 30 -2.017 0.28 0.634 60 -
BS 37.5 -2.844 0.229 0.895 75 -
BL 30 -3.848 -0.342 0.071 60 -
SH 30 -.285 0.451 1.06 60 -
SG 30 -1.661 0.54 1.124 60 -
AG 22.5 -12.331 -1.95 -0.463 45 -
NE 30 .193 0.331 0.842 60 -
JU 45 -2.005 1.492 2.284 90 -
Notes: Summary of the results of the RDD with unknown discontinuity points. The left hand side (first
6 columns) reports the results for the actual testing period, the last three columns report the testing
results for a placebo testing period (testing period -365 days). We report the resulting test value (Tn),
the bandwidth used in the specification test (htest), the critical values on the 10 and 5 percent level, the
bandwidth used in the threshold search (h), and the estimated threshold date ( Date cˆ) for each canton
in which the null was rejected. The bootstrap results are obtained using 1,500 resamples.
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Figure E.9 Probability of moving to a switcher municipality in 12 cantons - RDD plots around
the estimated threshold dates. Local linear smooth, using the same bandwidth (h) as in the
estimations in Table E.4, of the probability that a foreigner chooses to move to a switcher
municipality over the moving date, separately from both sides of the threshold for all cantons in
which a discontinuity was found. The dashed vertical lines indicate the testing region, the first
solid line indicates the vote date, and the second the estimated threshold date. The light gray
dots represent raw means within bins of 15 days.
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E.3 Additional tables and figures
Table E.5 RDD estimates of the probability that foreigners move to different definitions of
non-switcher municipalities
Dependent variable: Moving to a particular type of non-switcher municipality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. all all all ∆rank = 0 ∆rank = 0 ∆rank = 0
Effect ∆P 0.0824*** 0.0819*** 0.0601*** 0.00431 -4.22e-05 -0.00159
(0.0112) (0.00997) (0.00804) (0.00504) (0.00443) (0.00354)
P (type)before 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.02 0.02 0.02
Bandwidth 45 60 90 45 60 90
N left 5,971 7,415 11,636 5,971 7,415 11,636
N right 5,876 8,156 12,729 5,876 8,156 12729
(7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Dep. Var. ∆rank > 0 ∆rank > 0 ∆rank > 0 ∆rank < 0 ∆rank < 0 ∆rank < 0
Effect ∆P -0.00190 0.0191* 0.0128 0.0800*** 0.0628*** 0.0488***
(0.0123) (0.0107) (0.00842) (0.0158) (0.0138) (0.0109)
P (type)before 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.74 0.74 0.74
Bandwidth 45 60 90 45 60 90
N left 5,971 7,415 11,636 5,971 7,415 11,636
N right 5,876 8,156 12,729 5,876 8,156 12,729
Notes: Local polynomial sharp RDD estimates for the probability of moving to the respective municipality
type in the pooled sample of cantons. Standard errors in parentheses. P (type)before refers to the average
probability of moving to a municipality of the respective type within a range of 60 days before the
threshold date. Dependent variables: all refers to an indicator set to one if the municipality is a non-
switcher municipality, ∆rank = 0 refers to an indicator set to one if the municipality has not changed the
relative position, ∆rank > 0 refers to an indicator set to one if the municipality experienced a positive
rank change, and ∆rank < 0 refers to an indicator set to one if the municipality experienced a negative
rank change. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table E.6 Individual characteristics of movers around the threshold dates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Var. Age Age P(married) P(married) Duration CH Duration CH P(par. CH) P(par. CH) P(high skill) P(high skill)
Effect ∆ -1.238*** -0.549 -0.0173 -0.0178 0.000222 0.464 0.000141 -3.18e-05 0.00359 -0.0256
(0.443) (0.382) (0.0190) (0.0165) (0.381) (0.328) (0.00226) (0.00205) (0.0445) (0.0391)
Bandwidth 45 60 45 60 45 60 45 60 45 60
N left 5,971 7,415 5,971 7,415 5,971 7,415 5,971 7,415 661 815
N right 5,876 8,156 5,876 8,156 5,876 8,156 5,876 8,156 624 884
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates for different dependent variables in the pooled sample of
cantons. Standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variables: Age of the individual, P(married) an
indicator of whether a person is married, Duration CH the duration of stay in Switzerland, P(par. CH)
an indicator of whether a parent of an individual is Swiss, and P(high skill) is an indicator set to one
if an individual has an occupation in skill level 1 or 2. The sample size with regard to the skill level of
individuals is considerably smaller, as the information is only available for a small subsample in our data.
Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Table E.7 Municipality characteristics before and after the vote on the minaret initiative
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dep. Var. Tax rate Pop PopSwiss Popforeign Pop_wel Poppoor Poprich V acant Ncomp Natur
1(year ≥ 2009) –0.219 83.597*** 34.454*** 49.143*** –0.035 –0.000* 0.017*** –0.308** –0.402* –0.088
(0.908) (20.452) (9.794) (11.013) (0.022) (0.000) (0.001) (0.136) (0.213) (0.068)
Switcher municipality –0.963 –1424.448*** –1034.673*** –389.775*** –0.279** –0.001 0.026*** –0.269 –4.356*** –0.018
(1.014) (326.205) (234.113) (104.269) (0.104) (0.000) (0.007) (0.293) (1.425) (0.017)
Switcher ∗ 1(year ≥ 2009) 0.447 –38.086** –13.744** –24.342** 0.008 0.000 –0.001 0.499* 0.311 0.035
(0.630) (15.127) (6.208) (9.502) (0.078) (0.000) (0.001) (0.243) (0.255) (0.031)
No. of obs. 9,392 9,404 9,404 9,404 6,810 10,028 10,028 9,403 8,376 9,355
No. of clusters 23 24 24 24 25 25 25 24 24 24
R2 0.93 0.07 0.08 0.07 0.13 0.14 0.37 0.07 0.05 0.00
Notes: OLS estimations for annual municipality level data between 2007 and 2010, including cantonal
fixed effects. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at a cantonal level. Dependent variables:
Tax rate is the municipality tax multiplier, Pop is the municipality’s population measured as the sum of
the number of Swiss PopSwiss and foreign residents Popforeign, Popwel is the share of the population that
depends on welfare, Poppoor is the proportion of the population classified as poor, Poprich is the fraction of
the population that is classified as rich, V acant is the number of vacant apartments per 1,000 inhabitants,
Ncomp measures how many companies have been incorporated, and Natur measures the naturalization
rate of foreigners in the municipality. Differences in sample sizes occur, because low number of cases
in a municipality are not reported in the official statistics for reasons of privacy. Significance levels: *
.05<p<.1, ** .01<p<.05, *** p<.01.
Table E.8 Number of moving individuals around the threshold dates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep. Var. Nmove Nmove Nfrom_switch Nfrom_switch Nto_switch Nto_switch
Effect ∆N -0.0476 -0.609 -0.250 -0.103 -1.348*** -0.989**
(4.393) (4.310) (0.423) (0.380) (0.461) (0.389)
Bandwidth 60 90 60 90 60 90
N left 501 753 501 753 501 753
N right 492 738 492 738 492 738
Notes: Local linear sharp RDD estimates in the pooled sample of cantons. Standard errors in parentheses.
Dependent variables: Nmove corresponds to the number of foreigners moving. Nfrom_switch refers to the
number of foreigners leaving switcher municipalities, and Nto_switch refers to the number of foreigners
relocating to switcher municipalities. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Figure E.10 Number of individuals moving around the threshold in the pooled sample of
cantons. Local linear smooth of the number of individuals who move over the moving date,
separately from both sides of the threshold, using a bandwidth of 90 days. The light gray dots
represent raw means within bins of 10 days.
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Figure E.11 Number of individuals moving to a switcher municipality in the pooled sample of
cantons. Local linear smooth of the number of individuals who move to a switcher municipality
over the moving date, separately from both sides of the threshold, using a bandwidth of 90 days.
The light gray dots represent raw means within bins of 10 days.
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Figure E.12 Moving-pattern in 12 cantons for which a discontinuity was detected. This graph
shows the histograms of moving dates in our estimation sample and for cantons in which the
method detects a systematic discontinuity. The share in the parentheses after the canton abbre-
viation indicates the share of individuals moving at the last or the first day of the month. The
date of the minaret initiative is marked by the red solid vertical line, the estimated threshold
date by the black solid vertical line, and the typical moving dates (31 March, 30 June, and 30
September) by the gray dashed vertical lines.
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Figure E.13 Moving-pattern in 10 cantons for which no discontinuity was detected. This
graph shows the histograms of moving dates in our estimation sample for cantons for which no
systematic discontinuity was detected. The share in the parentheses after the canton abbreviation
indicates the share of individuals moving at the last or the first day of the month. The date of
the minaret initiative is marked by the red solid vertical line and the typical moving dates (31
March, 30 June, and 30 September) by the gray dashed vertical lines.
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Table E.9 Development of announced housing prices in switcher municipalities after the vote
Dependent variable: Prices in Swiss Francs per m2
Rental Rental Rental Selling Selling Selling
Overall Cantons with Cantons without Overall Cantons with Cantons without
discontinuity discontinuity discontinuity discontinuity
Post30 –0.256 –0.326 –0.127 164.165 292.630* 58.036
(0.181) (0.275) (0.164) (113.750) (151.217) (153.638)
Post60 0.670 0.312 1.028 168.799 573.462** –193.682
(0.478) (0.635) (0.598) (190.575) (244.266) (234.200)
Post90 0.373 –0.416 1.144* 76.054 526.348** –327.995
(0.667) (0.779) (0.526) (193.501) (202.643) (281.329)
Post120 0.702* 0.671 0.837 53.623 435.576 –287.920
(0.394) (0.624) (0.494) (248.235) (254.310) (382.660)
Post150 –0.557 –1.360 0.245 77.123 400.031 –222.698
(0.728) (0.870) (0.540) (253.740) (250.727) (411.115)
Post180 0.589 0.316 0.958 147.632 484.474 –170.629
(0.540) (0.751) (0.599) (256.009) (295.717) (407.314)
Post210 0.559 0.125 1.053** 210.680 544.005* –93.838
(0.550) (0.766) (0.456) (236.134) (261.888) (358.334)
Post240 0.437 –0.056 0.952 224.783 678.366** –275.280
(0.556) (0.700) (0.586) (285.593) (283.655) (430.179)
Post>240 0.079 –0.500 0.697 85.801 443.324* –229.747
(0.611) (0.762) (0.545) (226.690) (234.343) (362.431)
Switch ∗ post30 –0.007 –0.230 0.177 –66.802 –197.549 11.642
(0.257) (0.300) (0.251) (152.091) (211.957) (202.288)
Switch ∗ post60 –0.818** –1.183*** –0.445 –226.937 –327.660 –223.532
(0.340) (0.336) (0.355) (164.973) (247.702) (151.280)
Switch ∗ post90 –0.226 –0.392 0.010 –260.725* –476.821*** –75.101
(0.209) (0.255) (0.246) (134.579) (122.383) (184.265)
Switch ∗ post120 –0.624 –1.562*** 0.268 –207.293** –351.431** –70.410
(0.593) (0.500) (0.310) (97.257) (147.794) (96.809)
Switch ∗ post150 0.275 0.584 –0.049 –193.704* –285.968** –79.669
(0.262) (0.359) (0.410) (94.483) (106.670) (158.219)
Switch ∗ post180 –0.470 –1.127*** 0.154 –194.859** –228.517 –228.255
(0.412) (0.343) (0.176) (78.974) (127.500) (142.476)
Switch ∗ post210 –0.789*** –1.118*** –0.523** –284.153** –395.400** –184.505
(0.262) (0.243) (0.221) (123.615) (178.271) (143.849)
Switch ∗ post240 –0.406* –0.611*** –0.262 –304.131** –445.619** –153.113
(0.216) (0.186) (0.315) (134.040) (175.722) (144.426)
Switch ∗ post>240 –1.009*** –1.408*** –0.577** –258.177*** –364.187*** –189.018***
(0.300) (0.401) (0.219) (59.834) (88.756) (36.129)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Day of month FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weekday FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean Dep. 21.61 23.64 19.76 5,174.85 5,325.35 4,970.69
No. of obs. 234,439 111,570 122,869 97,904 56,359 41,545
No. of clusters 22 12 10 22 12 10
R2 0.37 0.35 0.27 0.46 0.49 0.40
Notes: Ordinary least squares estimates. The data is a collection of all housing advertisements on all
major Swiss online housing platforms. Our sample consists of 332,343 rental and selling price announce-
ments for apartments and houses with up to seven rooms between 2006 and 2010. The Post coefficients
capture the time pattern of prices for the period after the vote on the initiative in the comparison mu-
nicipalities. The coefficients of the Switch ∗ post. indicators measure the deviation in the time pattern
of prices between treated and comparison municipalities. Standard errors are clustered at the cantonal
level and reported in parentheses. Significance levels: * .05 < p < .1, ** .01 < p < .05, *** p < .01.
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Figure E.14 Raw monthly means of rental and selling prices over time for cantons in which a
discontinuity was detected. The dashed line represents the means for non-switcher municipalities
in the comparison group and the solid line the treatment group of switcher municipalities. The
solid vertical black line indicates the month of the vote.
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